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INSURANCE AGAINST CATASTROPHE:
GOVERNMENT STIMULATION OF
INSURANCE MARKETS FOR CATASTROPHIC
EVENTS
VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, MICHAEL FAURE & TOBIAS HELDT†
INTRODUCTION
As a result of climate change, technological development, and
other variables, natural and technological catastrophes have increased
1
dramatically. Moreover, due to infrastructural issues, such as building
in floodplains, damages resulting from catastrophes have increased as
2
well. The massive earthquake and tsunami that occurred in Japan on
March 11, 2011 are still fresh in people’s memories, providing
sobering illustrations of the extensive reach of such catastrophes.
After a catastrophe, which is defined for the purposes of this
Article as an accident with large losses in either the number of victims
or the amount of property damage, governments often intervene in
the compensation of catastrophe victims. However, the organization
of government intervention in the compensation varies from one
country to another and from one disaster to another. Governments
intervene either because no satisfying solution is available in the
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is a Ph.D. researcher at METRO and is connected to the Research Center for Nuclear Energy
in Mol, Belgium. The authors are grateful to the participants in the thirteenth joint seminar of
the European Association for Law and Economics and the Geneva Association in Milano in
May 2009, as well as to participants in an October 2009 seminar of the Amsterdam Centre for
Law and Economics for their useful comments on an earlier version.
1. See Laurens M. Bouwer, Have Disaster Losses Increased Due to Anthropogenic
Climate Change?, 92 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 39, 43 (2011) (discussing increased
economic losses resulting from climate change-influenced disasters).
2. See id.
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private market or to fulfill the requirements of existing compensation
schemes. Political pressure for such intervention may also be large.
Private insurance markets for catastrophic risks may fail for a
variety of reasons, and governments may try to intervene to stimulate
the insurability of catastrophic risks or to take over insurance
functions when markets fail. Demand for catastrophe insurance may
be too low even though such insurance would result in increased
utility for potential victims (as in the case of flood insurance). In
other cases, risk-modeling calculations may be difficult or the damage
that could potentially be caused by a catastrophe may overwhelm the
capacity of insurance markets.
Government intervention in compensation for catastrophe
victims can take a variety of forms. In some cases (for example, in
France), the government forces potential victims to purchase
comprehensive insurance; in others (for example, in the case of the
California Earthquake Authority), the government replaces the
primary insurer and directly provides coverage to potential disaster
victims. In yet other situations (for example, with terrorism risk), the
government acts as a reinsurer of last resort and intervenes when the
magnitude of loss exceeds a specific threshold. The government may
also provide an additional insurance layer—for example, in nuclear
liability conventions, the government supplements compensation
provided by the operator of the power plant. Finally, the government
may provide direct compensation to victims of catastrophes either
through structural fund solutions or on an ad hoc basis.
These various forms of government intervention have been
criticized in the literature. Most of the criticism concentrates on
3
government provision of ex post compensation on an ad hoc basis.
However, some critics also address the type of government
intervention on which we focus in this Article—on the government
acting as a facilitator of insurance markets or as a reinsurer of last
4
resort. Notwithstanding the criticism, schemes in which the
government facilitates the insurability of catastrophic risks—including
terrorism and natural disasters—are on the rise. The importance of
compensating victims of catastrophes (after 9/11, the focus was

3. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks, 12 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 287 (1996); see also Michael G. Faure, Financial Compensation for
Victims of Catastrophes: A Law and Economics Perspective, 29 L. & POL’Y 339 (2007).
4. See Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, A Role for Government?, 25 REG. 44, 44 (2002)
[hereinafter Role for Government]; see also Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and
Insurance Markets: A Role for the Government as Insurer?, 36 IND. L. REV. 447, 448 (2003).
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strongly on terrorism; after Katrina, flooding came to the forefront;
and after the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, compensation for
victims of those risks soared on the political agenda) gives rise to the
question whether such a government role should indeed be
considered problematic, especially when compared with the
alternative of providing outright ex post compensation to victims on
an ad hoc basis. This is the main question we will address in this
Article.
Our paper is structured as follows: we first identify the various
types of government intervention in compensating victims of
catastrophes. Next, we focus specifically on the types of government
intervention that stimulate insurability of catastrophic risks and
analyze how these forms of intervention can be considered from a
law-and-economics perspective. Then, we focus more particularly on
the role of government as a (re)insurer of catastrophic risks and
sketch the conditions under which such intervention may be effective.
Finally, we compare these starting points with several cases (relating
to both terrorism and natural disasters) in which the government
stimulates insurability.
I. TYPES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN COMPENSATION FOR
CATASTROPHES
Natural catastrophes, industrial disasters, and terrorist attacks
pose a number of challenges for insurers. These catastrophes involve
very large losses that occur only rarely, and this requires large
financial reserves to be built up over time. Pricing catastrophe
insurance products is complicated by a number of factors, including
the difficulty of predicting the frequency and probability of
catastrophic accidents and their related losses (although some
catastrophe-modeling firms have made such calculations the core of
5
their business). Spreading the risk of catastrophe losses over a
sufficiently large base of buyers is also difficult and makes it harder
6
for insurers to offer affordable products. Given these obstacles, the
traditional insurance sector will increasingly have to rely upon the
reinsurance (i.e. insurance for insurance companies) market to

5. See ZURICH AM. INSURANCE CO., CATASTROPHE RISK AND THE COST OF REAL
ESTATE INSURANCE POLICIES (2009), available at http://www.zurichna.com/internet/zna/
sitecollectiondocuments/en/media/whitepapers/rewhitepapercatastropherisk.pdf.
6. See Michael Faure & Véronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-Party
Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 21 (2008) (discussing the lack of demand for first-party disaster
coverage).
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recompense catastrophic damages to the victims. However, Professor
Kenneth Froot found that insurers generally use reinsurance to cover
only a small fraction of the financial exposure of households and
7
firms to catastrophic natural disasters. This is all the more worrying
because many primary insurance companies do not have enough
capital and surplus themselves to survive medium and large
8
catastrophes.
9
Admittedly, the Solvency II Directive mitigates this situation to
a certain extent because insurers and reinsurers are obliged to have
sufficient capital in their reserves for all of the risks that they are
facing. This reduces the risk of insolvency; however, it does not
eliminate the possibility of insufficient capital in case of a large-scale
catastrophe. In sum, both insurance and reinsurance markets may fail,
given that the losses resulting from mega-disasters may be too large
10
for the reinsurers’ financial capacities.
Given these difficulties, what role can be granted to the
government in the context of financing compensation for victims of
catastrophes? More particularly, how can the state improve the
functioning of catastrophe (re)insurance markets? The government
can take several seemingly different approaches in crafting policies
11
for managing catastrophe risks and compensating attendant losses.
“First, the government can rely primarily on the private insurance
12
market.” Second, the government can provide direct compensation
13
to the catastrophe victims. Third, the government can institute
mandatory comprehensive insurance. Fourth, the government itself

7. KENNETH A. FROOT, THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 1, 2 (Kenneth A. Froot
ed., 1999).
8. See id.: see also VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS:
A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 136 (Kurt Deketelaere et al. eds., 2010).
9. See Directive 2009/138, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
November 2009 on the Taking-Up and Pursuit of the Business of Insurance and Reinsurance
(Solvency II), 2009 O.J. (L 1104) 1, 24.
10. The high catastrophe losses sustained in the first half of 2011 have already had an
impact on capital and pricing in the reinsurance market. Since the January 1, 2011 insurance
contracts renewal, the decline in the capital positions of some reinsurers has exerted pricing
pressure on catastrophe-exposed markets. See Guy Carpenter, WORLD CATASTROPHE
REINSURANCE MARKET REVIEW 6 (September 2011), available at http://www.guycarp.com/
portal/extranet/insights/reportsPDF/2011/World%20Catastrophe%20Report%202011.pdf;jsessi
onid=Pp8bH0fPwZX3cnp53yR4Fzr2tBZFrs6GW2TLJ7FLhJB0ZGdn9HpQ!1763263147?vid=2.
11. BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 187.
12. Id. at 188.
13. Id.
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can provide catastrophe insurance. “[Fifth,] the government can share
the catastrophe risk with the private sector by acting as a reinsurer of
14
last resort.” Sixth, the government can finance catastrophic damages
through an additional insurance layer above the insurers’ own
financing. Finally, new forms of government intervention, such as
acting as a lender of last resort, have been proposed. Government
intervention can also include a combination of any of these
15
mechanisms.
The remainder of this section will discuss the various ways in
which the government can intervene in compensating victims of
catastrophes, along with providing relevant examples. In some cases,
government intervention can be insurance-related or can stimulate
insurability, whereas in others, government does not take any
insurance objectives into account. The main thrust of our article is
that government collaboration with insurance markets is generally
preferred over mechanisms in which such collaboration is absent.
A. Relying on the Private Insurance Market

16

This approach entails the least amount of government
intervention in catastrophe insurance markets. The government does
not assume any risk for losses covered by catastrophe insurance.
Instead, it focuses on removing barriers that limit the ability of
insurance markets to provide catastrophe coverage.
Various options for increasing capacity of private insurance
markets are open to the government. First, federal regulations can be
relaxed to encourage the issuance of catastrophe bonds (for example,
by making it easier to issue bonds for which the principal and not just
the interest of the bondholder is at risk). Second, and especially
relevant for the United States, accounting standards and tax laws can
be adapted so that private insurers can establish reserves in
anticipation of catastrophic events on a tax-free basis. The idea is that
if insurance firms hold sufficient capital and reserves, then the risk of
ruin from a catastrophic event can be reduced to a manageable level,
thus allowing for the emergence of a private market for catastrophe
17
insurance. Third, government can help set up a voluntary pool of
numerous insurers active in the catastrophe insurance market. Mutual
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Part I.A borrows from a book written by one of the authors: BRUGGEMAN, supra note
8, at 188. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted.
17. This is one of the purposes of the European Solvency II Directive.
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risk retention pools, organized within the private markets, help create
private markets for the provision of catastrophe insurance. Of course,
these options might allow insurers to cover larger losses than they
would be able to cover otherwise, but it is still unlikely that the
industry would be able to cover the largest of losses. Nevertheless,
they may, in some cases, be sufficient to activate or reactivate private
catastrophe insurance markets, as evidenced by two examples from
18
the United States.
Evidence of the U.S. government helping the catastrophe
insurance market is “provided by two features of the quasi-public
agencies created to provide insurance coverage for wind damage
19
(Florida) and earthquakes (California),” the Florida Hurricane
Catastrophe Fund and the California Earthquake Authority (CEA),
respectively.
First, the capital raised by each agency is available only for paying
claims on its natural disaster coverage, since the quasi-public
agencies are fully protected against any take-over attempts by
private market firms . . . The accounting rules that otherwise
preclude the earmarking of capital to specific expected catastrophe
losses are hereby circumvented. Second, both agencies acquired
special tax exemptions from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS, the
US tax authority). Both of the above discussed accounting and
taxation issues were hereby solved, and this was essential to their
success in reviving activity in their respective natural disaster
markets. However, it is intriguing that the US accounting and tax
authorities appear unwilling to provide similar opportunities to
20
private sector entities.

B. Providing Direct Compensation to Victims of Catastrophes
In many situations, governments provide generous ex post
compensation to victims of a catastrophe. The motivations for these
interventions may vary. In some cases, it is argued that, out of
solidarity, public funds should be used to provide (partial)
21
compensation to victims. In other cases (this may be an especially
strong argument in case of terrorist attacks), the government may be

18. DWIGHT M. JAFFEE, REPORT ON THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE COVERAGE OF
TERRORISM RISKS 21 (2004).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Jef Van Langendonck, International Social Insurance for Natural Disasters?, in
SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 183, 192–93 (Willem H.
Van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 2007).
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22

best placed to take preventive measures. If these preventive
measures have not been taken, direct compensation through public
funds can provide alternative means for the government to live up to
its responsibilities.
Ex post compensation by the state can be ad hoc or of a
structural nature. In the case of ad hoc compensation, “the
government decides in each case, depending upon the size of the
23
catastrophe, whether public funds will be made available or not” and
if so, to what amount. In contrast, one example of a structural
solution is the institution of a compensation fund for victims of
natural catastrophes.
Examples of structural direct compensation to victims of
catastrophes can be found in many legal systems. Austria established
a fund for catastrophes in 1996, which is “financed from income and
corporate taxes and only covers part of the property damage suffered
24
by victims of a catastrophe.” Belgium established a structural fund in
25
1976; however, the importance of the fund has recently been
seriously reduced due to the introduction of mandatory
26
comprehensive insurance in Belgian legislation. Structural funds also
exist in the United States, where:
[t]he Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) distributes
—inter alia to local governments—substantial amounts from its
disaster relief fund . . . [but] most of [the] federal assistance
through FEMA is provided as emergency aid, hazard mitigation
assistance, or public assistance to communities. It is therefore not
comparable with a [structural] compensation fund that directly pays
compensation for damage to victims, as is the case in Austria or
27
Belgium.

There are also numerous examples of ad hoc solutions that
provide immediate disaster relief for specific cases. A well-known
example in the United States is the September 11th Victim

22. Id.
23. Faure, supra note 3, at 353.
24. Michael Faure, Comparative and Policy Conclusions, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 389, 415 (Michael
Faure and Ton Hartlief eds., 2006), citing Dagmar Hinghofer-Szalkay & Bernhard A. Koch,
Austria, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL APPROACH 7, 12 (Michael Faure and Ton Hartlief eds., 2006).
25. See Isabelle C. Durant, Belgium, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF
CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 37, 59–69 (Michael Faure and Ton
Hartlief eds., 2006).
26. Id.
27. Faure, supra note 24, at 417–18.
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28

Compensation Fund. The fact that compensation is provided on an
ad hoc rather than a structural basis does not mean that the amounts
of compensation will be lower.
For example, in Germany after the “flood of the century” of the
river Elbe in 2002, ad hoc compensation was provided through the
so-called Flutopferhilfesolidaritätsgesetz, which provided a total
amount of compensation of 8.1 billion euros. Also, in Italy the
amounts paid by the Italian government as ad hoc compensation
are on average 3.5 to 4 billion euros per year as a consequence of
which a relevant share of the states’ yearly budget is devoted to
29
restoring damage as a result of catastrophes.

The Dutch government intervened with ad hoc compensation to
30
the victims of the fireworks explosion in Enschede and the large café
fire in Volendam. The young Volendam victims received a total of
€30.1 million from the state, amounting to about €150,000 per victim,
31
whereas the Enschede victims received only €120,000 per person. In
the end, the national government in both instances not only provided
compensation for the direct costs—as was initially the idea—but also
provided large amounts of ad hoc compensation. Reports on (more or
less generous) ad hoc ex post compensation have also come from
32
many other countries. The efficiency of this type of government
intervention will be further analyzed in Part II.A.

28. See Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, United States, in FINANCIAL
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHIES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 7, 12
(Michael Faure and Ton Hartlief eds., 2006); see also MARSHALL S. SHAPO, COMPENSATION
FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 105–25 (2005); Kenneth P. Nolan & Jeanne M. O’Grady, The
Victim Compensation Fund—Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 231
(2003); George L. Priest, The Problematic Structure of the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 527 (2003); Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719 (2003).
29. MICHAEL FAURE & KLAUS HEINE, CAN EUROPEAN STATE AID CONTROL LEARN
FROM THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTROUS CRISES? 7, prepared for Ausschuss für
Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik Verein für Socialpolitik (2010), available at
http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/06/vs/Tagungen/2010/Heine-Faure_Referat.pdf
(citation
omitted).
30. See Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief, The Netherlands, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 195, 219–20 (Michael
Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006).
31. GUIDO SUURMOND, ENFORCING FIRE SAFETY IN THE CATERING INDUSTRY: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 261 (Leiden Univ. Press, 2008).
32. For a comparative overview, see generally the contributions in FINANCIAL
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH
(Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006).
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C. Providing Mandatory Comprehensive Insurance
In some cases, the government does not intervene to cure
problems on the supply side of disaster insurance, but instead
attempts to remedy information failures on the demand side.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that even in countries where
disaster insurance is widely available (such as in the United States
and in Europe), individuals tend not to make sufficient use of it,
resulting in dramatic cases of underinsurance. This became apparent
33
after the “flood of the century” of the river Elbe in Germany and
34
after Hurricane Katrina in the United States.
There are several reasons for this low demand for disaster
insurance. First, low-probability events like natural disasters are
35
systematically misjudged, resulting in an “it will not happen to me”
36
attitude. Second, there is equally strong empirical evidence that
people ex ante prefer large uncertain losses over smaller certain
losses. Insurance is considered an investment; however, as the
potential victim—for example, a homeowner—is confronted with the
certain loss of a premium and a low expectation of a return on the
37
“investment” during his lifetime, demand for this investment is low.
Third, literature indicates that ex post government relief reduces
38
incentives to purchase insurance coverage.
The limited demand for disaster coverage can lead to legislative
action to stimulate the availability of (affordable) insurance. In some

33. See, e.g., Alfred Endres, et al., ‘Land unter!’ Ein Institutionenökonomische
Zwischenruf, 29 LIST FORUM FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS UND FINANZPOLITIK 284 (2003); see also
Ulrich Magnus, Germany, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A
COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 119, 124 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006) (noting
that because the magnitude of losses from the flood exceeded capacity, the solidarity of the
public was required to provide adequate compensation); Reimund Schwarze & Gert G.
Wagner, In the Aftermath of Dresden: New Directions in German Flood Insurance, 29 THE
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 154, 154–55 (proposing an alternative mandatory form of
natural hazard insurance based on pooling).
34. See generally ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA
(Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2006).
35. See Paul Slovic, Howard Kunreuther & Gilbert White, Decision Processes, Rationality
and Adjustment to Natural Hazards, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 187, 187 (2000) (discussing
decisionmaking responses to natural disasters in a technological society).
36. Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses through Insurance, 12 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 171, 175 (1996).
37. Paul Slovic et al., Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance
Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS. 237, 237 (1977).
38. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 3, at 293–96; see also Scott E. Harrington, Rethinking
Disaster Policy, 23 REG. 40, 41–46 (2000) (demonstrating the effects of moral hazard and
adverse selection).
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cases, this goes as far as imposing mandatory coverage for the
consequences of catastrophes. The economic rationale in favor of this
system will be further developed in Part II.B.
France provides one of the best-known examples of this type of
intervention. Through the Act of July 13, 1982, France created a duty
in its “code des assurances” to provide coverage for the consequences
of natural disasters in addition to “voluntarily purchased first-party
insurance policies covering damage against property, as well as firstparty car insurance policies covering the insured value of the car and
39
property left in it.” This mandatory additional disaster coverage (in
other words, catastrophe insurance must be bundled with ordinary car
and home insurance) was introduced because such damage would
40
normally be considered uninsurable. Insurers are only liable for such
damages if the government declares a certain incident to be a natural
41
disaster. The coverage for natural catastrophes is:
[A] percentage of the insurance premium paid by each insured and
is decided upon by the Government, in the form of a Decree. In
practice, this comes down to the ‘national solidarity principle,’ since
every citizen and business firm will pay the same extra-charge rate
whatever his or her exposure to the natural catastrophe risk . . . .
Apart from the additional insurance premium, also the applicable
42
and mandatory deductibles are fixed in a Decree.

This French example of a mandatory comprehensive coverage
system has recently been followed in Belgium. Through the Acts of
May 21, 2003 and September 17, 2005, a mandatory extension for
natural disasters (flooding, earthquakes, impoundment of public
sewers, landslides, or subsidence) was added to the voluntarily
43
purchased fire insurance coverage for so-called simple risks. As a
result, ninety to ninety-five percent of the Belgian population has
now been insured against such natural-catastrophe risks. “The insurer
can investigate the natural hazard risk for every individual case and

39. Act No. 82-600 of 13 July 1982 on the Indemnification of Victims of Natural
Catastrophes, JORF 2242 (1982); BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 303.
40. See BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 303 (offering an explanation of the French system
where first-party insurance automatically includes natural disasters); see also Michel Cannarsa,
Fabien Lafay & Olivier Moréteau, France, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF
CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH, (Michael Faure and Ton Hartlief eds.,
2006) (offering a detailed description of mandatory disaster coverage).
41. See generally Olivier Moréteau, Policing the Compensation of Victims of Catastrophes:
Combining Solidarity and Self-Responsibility, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 199–218 (Willem H. Van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 2006).
42. BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 306–07 (citation omitted).
43. See id. at 247–60 (describing in detail the Belgian system).
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will adjust the extra premium accordingly . . . . The final premium
44
will hence differ in function of the real risk.” The introduction of
such a mandatory insurance scheme for disasters has also been
45
proposed in German legal scholarship. A variety of legislative
46
proposals with the same aim have also been introduced in Italy.
D. Government-Provided Insurance: Government Acting as Primary
47
Insurer
In the most extreme form of intervention in victim
compensation, the government serves as the primary insurer, taking
on all insurance functions, including defining the coverage, setting the
prices, and bearing the risk. Such government intervention can take
two forms: 1) complete and free government insurance; and 2) full
government insurance by a quasi-public entity operating under
48
constraints imposed by legislation. The former empowers a
government, which defines the coverage, bears the risk, and plans to
49
finance the costs from general tax revenues.
Equitable
considerations are one of the main motivations for this type of
50
government intervention. However, complete government insurance
also reduces the incentive for citizens to mitigate their actual losses in
51
case of catastrophe. The second type of full government insurance
involves a quasi-public entity, which is empowered to set premiums
and bear the catastrophe risks under voluntary coverage. Legislation
can then require large initial capital contributions to the agency from
private insurance firms, which are thereby relieved of the need to

44. Id. at 256.
45. See, e.g., Endres et al., supra note 33, at 284–94; see also Schwarze & Wagner, supra
note 33, at 163–67 (arguing that general mandatory insurance would protect against a wide
variety of mega-disasters and force individuals to buy their own insurance instead of relying on
government aid and donations).
46. See Alberto Monti & Filippo Andrea Chiaves, Italy, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHIES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 146, 186–91 (Michael
Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006) (describing how the Italian government presented a bill in
1999 which would regulate all natural disaster insurance, and in 2001 Senator Manfredi
presented a bill which would regulate private citizens’ relationships with private disaster
insurance companies).
47. Part I.D borrows from a book by of one of the authors, see BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8,
at 190. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted.
48. See JAFFEE, supra note 18, at 24.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Jack Hirshleifer, War Damage Insurance, 35 REV. ECON. & STAT. 144, 144–53
(1953).
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provide direct coverage. As a result, private insurance companies may
and do compete with the government. However, this may crowd out
wholly private competitors, who may eventually only offer coverage
for low-risk locations and structures.
As mentioned above, equitable considerations supply the main
52
motivation for providing complete and free government insurance.
This motivation “would seem appropriate when the losses incurred
53
are the result of a common national policy such as a war.” Some
countries, such as Israel and Northern Ireland, therefore offer
coverage for losses due to terrorism to all persons without direct
54
cost. The government bears the entire risk, which is funded from
55
general tax revenues.
56
In California, the CEA, created after the 1994 Northridge
Earthquake, assumes primary responsibility for bearing earthquake
57
risk, and the primary insurer plays an exclusively administrative role.
58
The CEA thus “provides an example of full government insurance.”
The CEA is a quasi-public entity empowered to set premiums and
bear risks under three constraints: 1) legislation determines the
59
classes of real-estate losses which may and may not be covered; 2)
legislation requires premiums be set on an “actuarial basis” (though,
in practice, the quoted CEA premiums have been “tempered,”
60
moderating the price differences across regions); and 3) “legislation
require[s] large initial capital contributions from []private insurance
firms, which [are] thereby relieved of the need to provide direct
coverage. The legislation allows CEA to purchase reinsurance, but
61
denies CEA to have access to public funds.”
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), administered by
FEMA, is another example of government assuming the role of

52. JAFFEE, supra note 18, at 24.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. The reader will notice that we mentioned the CEA in Part I.A as an example of relying
on the private insurance market and here as government as primary insurer. The reason is that
the CEA still relies on private insurers, but they merely administer the risk; risk-bearing was
taken over by the government.
57. See FAURE & HEINE, supra note 29, at 9–10.
58. Id. at 9.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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62

primary risk insurer. The NFIP can be regarded as a variant on the
CEA: like the state of California, the U.S. federal government has
stepped in and assumed the risk of financial loss associated with a
disastrous flood. The NFIP, created under the Housing and Urban
63
Development Act of 1968, is a joint private industry and federal
government cooperative program enabling homeowners and
businesses in participating communities to purchase subsidized
64
insurance protection against losses from flooding. Subsidized
insurance is provided to properties that were in existence at the time
the area in which they are located was identified as a Special Flood
65
Hazard Area (SFHA). The SFHA consists of land subject to a one
percent or greater chance of flooding in any given year. Such areas
66
are commonly referred to as subject to the one-hundred-year flood.
“In exchange for the availability of subsidized insurance for existing
buildings, communities are required to protect new construction and
substantially improved structures through the adoption and
enforcement of community floodplain management ordinances” or
67
regulations. The NFIP thus consists of a quid pro quo arrangement:
the federal government makes insurance available to community
residents at subsidized rates in exchange for the adoption and
enforcement of floodplain regulatory ordinances by community
officials.
E. Government-Provided Reinsurance: Government as a Reinsurer of
68
Last Resort
Under this approach to government involvement in catastrophe
insurance, the state assumes at least part of the risk for losses from

62. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM:
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 3 (2002).
63. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub.L.No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. The one-hundred-year flood represents a magnitude and frequency of flooding that
has a statistical probability of being equaled or exceeded in any given year, or, stated
alternatively, the one-hundred-year flood has—ironically (and reflective of public misperception
of flood risks)—a 26 percent (or one in four) chance of occurring over the life of a thirty-year
mortgage. The one-percent-annual-chance flood was chosen because it provides a high level of
protection while not imposing overly stringent requirements or excessive costs on property
owners. See Raymond J. Burby, Flood Insurance And Floodplain Management: The US
Experience, 3 ENV’T HAZARDS 111–22 (2001).
67. FEMA, supra note 62, at 3.
68. Part I.E borrows from a book written by one of the authors, see BRUGGEMAN, supra
note 8, at 189. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted

Faure (Do Not Delete)

198

1/7/2013 7:51 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 23:185

catastrophes. Although this approach requires government
intervention (since the private insurance market cannot provide
adequate catastrophe insurance coverage), the underlying philosophy
is that private insurance should continue to play a significant role in
allocating compensation for victims of catastrophes. Thus, this option
usually takes the form of a multi-layered insurance program that is
normally administered by private insurance companies that sell the
insurance, collect premiums, and pay claims.
In one example of a multilayered insurance program, the first
layer of (small) catastrophe losses is borne by the victims themselves
to provide loss-reducing incentives and prevent moral hazard. Private
insurance companies cover the second layer of catastrophe losses with
risk-based premiums and coverage depending on the surplus of the
insurer, its current portfolio, and its ability to diversify across risks.
The third layer of losses is covered by reinsurance and catastrophe
bonds, which are to be acquired by the primary insurers. Once these
funds are exhausted, a government reinsurance program covers the
fourth layer of risk, consisting of extreme losses. The government is,
in other words, involved as a reinsurer of last resort.
If the government acts as a reinsurer of last resort, it mainly
provides reinsurance at the highest risk levels, while primary insurers
and reinsurers retain responsibility for some or all of the lower risk
levels. The sharing of risk with private industry is achieved through a
mandatory deductible limit at the lowest risk level and through
coinsurance at intermediate risk levels. Various features of a
government acting as a reinsurer of last resort can be considered,
including, for example, the price of premiums for the government’s
reinsurance facility, mandatory or voluntary participation in the plan,
establishment of the maximum retained risks and risk-coverage
limitations, and the possibility of incorporating a sunset provision.
In any case, government involvement in insurance coverage for
catastrophic events does not function like traditional insurance for
69
the following reasons: (1) where premiums are charged, they may be
explicitly subsidized or set based on incomplete measures of the risks
involved, which may result in an implicit subsidy, even in the absence
of clear statutory intent to subsidize the coverage; (2) the
government’s insurance commitment may extend over multiple time

69. See SOPHIE M. KORCZYK, NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. CO., INSURING THE
UNINSURABLE: PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKETS AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN CASES
OF EXTREME RISK 1–2 (2005).
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periods, allowing the government to recoup past losses through future
premiums or other revenues; (3) the government may have a unique
capacity to mitigate risks, for example by enforcing floodplain
management standards or conducting financial examinations of
insured financial institutions; (4) the government may provide backup coverage financed through general government revenues rather
than premiums paid by the insured; and (5) the government may act
as a monopoly in the insurance market, giving rise to low-quality
services with low prices, which may impede the provision of
preventive incentives that should be embedded in good insurance
70
policies.
A multi-layered insurance program, with the government acting
71
as a reinsurer of last resort, has been proposed by Robert Litan and
72
Professor Howard Kunreuther for insuring catastrophe losses in the
United States.
The current schemes for terrorism insurance in France
(GAREAT), Germany (Extremus), the UK (Pool Re), the
Netherlands (Dutch Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Company (NHT)),
and the United States (Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA)) all
73
have features of governments acting as a reinsurer of last resort.
Pool Re provides an example in the U.K.:
The British government created Pool Re as a reinsurer of last
resort in 1993 after private reinsurers reduced their coverage for
risks from terrorism following bombings by the Irish Republican
Army (IRA). With Pool Re, which is mutually owned by
participating insurers, primary insurers may reinsure their risks
from terrorism for commercial property losses and losses from
business interruption . . . Pool Re sets premiums on the basis of
the amount of insurance coverage, geographic location, and other
risk factors.

70. But see infra Part II.C (showing how insurance provided by a state monopoly is not
bad under some circumstances).
71. ROBERT E. LITAN, BROOKINGS INST., POLICY BRIEF #150: PREPARING FOR FUTURE
“KATRINAS” 6–7 (2006) (proposing a federal office that formally insures citizens for mega
catastrophes).
72. Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster
Insurance? in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 196 (Ronald
J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006); Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather than Discretion:
Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101, 109–13 (2006).
73. MICHAEL FAURE & KLAUS HEINE, INSURANCE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE WAY
FORWARD, proposal submitted to 29th Annual Conference of the European Association for Law
and Economics (Sept. 2012) (citing DWIGHT M. JAFFEE, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND
ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE COVERAGE OF
TERRORISM RISKS 26–31 (2004)).
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However, primary insurers are free to set the price of terrorism
74
coverage they offer. Pool Re must reinsure all offered policies;
coverage begins after primary insurers pay roughly the first $150,000
75
in claims. In turn, the British government reinsures Pool Re and
agrees to guarantee any loans or lines of credit that the pool might
76
seek. “Once the pool’s reserves exceed $1.5 billion, it will pay to the
government the greater of 10 percent of the net premiums remitted
77
each year or a payment geared to the government’s past losses.”
Because the system has been self-supporting, the state has never had
78
to intervene as a reinsurer of last resort.
F. Government Simply Providing an Additional Insurance Layer
Under another approach, the government finances catastrophic
damages through an additional insurance layer, outside of the
insurance market and on an ex post level, above the insurers’ own
financing. This scheme aims to supplement compensation from
insurers (if needed) and thus to maximize the protection of victims in
79
case damages exceed certain limits. Thus, under this approach the
state merely guarantees an additional layer of compensation and does
80
little to facilitate insurability.
The nuclear liability conventions of the 1960s provided for a
81
multi-layered compensation system. The first layer of the
compensation is payable by the licensee of the nuclear power plant
responsible for the incident (and covered by its insurance), the
second, much larger, layer is provided by the state, and the third layer
82
is provided by all the contracting parties. “The rights of victims of a
nuclear accident to be compensated for losses are governed by

74. CONG. BUDGET OFF., FEDERAL REINSURANCE FOR DISASTERS 50 (2002), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/37xx/doc3787/09-20federalreinsurance.pdf.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 203.
80. Id.
81. Michael G. Faure, Insurability of Damage Caused by Climate Change: A Commentary,
155 PENN. L. REV. 1875, 1886 (2007).
82. Id.
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83

international conventions,” such as the Convention of Paris of July
29, 1960, the Convention of Brussels of January 31, 1963, and the
Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear damages of May 21,
84
1963. “The conventions make the licensee of a nuclear plant strictly
liable and introduce compulsory insurance. However, the maximum
amount of compensation is limited, and short statutes of limitations
85
apply.” The conventions state that the signatory nations should
provide for minimum compensation to victims, but, within the limits
set by the convention, the nations are free to set the maximum
86
amount of compensation. This regime has been changed by a
87
protocol of 2004 which has, however, not yet entered into force.
G. New Forms of Government Intervention

88

Responsible governments aim to offer financial compensation in
case insurance and reinsurance markets suffer from surplus depletion
following a catastrophic event. As discussed above, the government
can act, inter alia, as a primary insurer or as a reinsurer of last resort.
The latter role can be further limited to losses that exceed some
threshold of insurance industry losses. The government thereby
auctions excess-of-loss (XOL) contracts to insurers and reinsurers.
The government can also act as a lender of last resort.

83. Michael Faure, Economic Models of Compensation for Damage Caused by Nuclear
Accidents: Some Lessons for the Revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions, 2 EURO. J. LAW
& ECON. 21, 21 (1995).
84. See id. at 24–25.
85. Id. at 21.
86. See generally id. (arguing that a mutual pooling system, whereby all nuclear plants
share the costs of an accident, could be fitted into a revision of the Paris and Vienna
Conventions on liability for nuclear accidents); Michael Faure & Tom Vanden Borre,
Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International
Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y REV. 220, 220–86 (2008) (comparing
the evolution of the American nuclear compensation scheme under the Price-Anderson Act to
international compensation schemes); Göran Skogh, A European Nuclear Accident Pool, 33
THE GENEVA PAPERS 274, 274–87 (2008) (explaining how compensation to victims would be
better organized by an organization like the European Union, which could hold states strictly
liable, as opposed to the current system where compensation is based on the OECD Paris
Convention and the UN Vienna Convention and where a plant is strictly liable but victims are
left without compensation if the plant is insolvent).
87. See Nuclear Energy Agency, Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability,
OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-conventionratification.html (showing the latest status of ratifications or accessions).
88. Parts I.G, I.G.1, and I.G.2 borrow from a book written by one of the authors, see
BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 190–92, 205–06. To ease readability, quotation marks have been
omitted.
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1. Federal Excess-of-Loss Reinsurance Contracts
Economist Christopher Lewis and Professor Kevin Murdock
propose a form of federal reinsurance that complements existing
insurance and reinsurance products, focuses on diversifying large
disaster losses over time, and also limits the federal government’s
89
exposure to additional losses. Specifically, the federal government
would sell per-occurrence XOL contracts to private insurers and
reinsurers, in which both the coverage layer and the fixed payout of
the contract would be based on aggregate insurance-industry losses,
and not on company-specific losses. These XOL contracts would be
available for qualified insurance companies, pools, and reinsurers,
and would cover industry losses in the twenty-five to fifty billion
dollar layer of coverage—or any layer unavailable in the private
market. Lewis and Murdock further suggest for these auctions to be
conducted subject to a reservation price sufficient to support the
expected loss and expense costs under the contracts as well as to
include a risk premium that would encourage private-market
crowding-out of government reinsurance. If a catastrophe occurred
that would trigger payment under the contracts, the federal
government would finance the loss payments by issuing bonds.
The rationale for government provision of these contracts is that
the capacity of private insurance and reinsurance markets is currently
inadequate to provide coverage for losses of this magnitude. The
government has a superior ability to diversify risks across time
through the exercise of federal borrowing power. While it is costly for
private insurers to raise additional capital following a loss shock,
federal debt is viewed as more secure and thus the government would
not find its cost of capital increasing significantly in the wake of a
catastrophe. The proposed XOL contracts would help to solve the
problems in insurance markets while potentially reducing the federal
government’s role in providing disaster relief payments to property
owners following a catastrophe. The contracts do not provide a
subsidy to insurers but instead are designed to be self-supporting in
terms of expected value—that is, the contracts are to be priced so that
the expected cost to the government is zero.

89. Christopher M. Lewis & Kevin C. Murdock, The Role of Government Contracts in
Discretionary Reinsurance Markets for Natural Disasters, 63 J. RISK & INSURANCE 567, 567
(1996); David Cummins, Christopher M. Lewis, & Richard D. Phillips, Pricing Excess-of-Loss
Reinsurance Contracts against Catastrophic Loss, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHIC RISK
93 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999).
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Both authors argue that this form of limited per-occurrence XOL
contract is the preferred reinsurance mechanism for the government
because it would expand the capacity and stability of the catastrophe
insurance industry, while limiting the taxpayers’ exposure to the
insured catastrophic event. Furthermore, a targeted and risk-specific
government reinsurance program has the advantage of supplying
reinsurance without imposing large liability on the government.
Moreover, by offering a complementary reinsurance vehicle that does
not compete with the private sector, efficient coverage can be
provided to the private insurance markets whenever feasible. Further
advantages include that the federal government may carry less of an
insolvency risk and that the risk premiums required by the
government reinsurer for upper layers of catastrophe risk will be
significantly below the premiums required by private reinsurers. The
key advantage of the auction device is that the private insurance firms
play a major role in determining the price they must pay to obtain the
government’s reinsurance contract, in contrast to the existing options
in which the price is administratively determined by the government.
A potential drawback of the auctioning of XOL reinsurance
contracts “may be in the details, since the government must
determine all of the auction conditions, including how much
aggregate coverage to offer, and the conditions under which new
‘tranche’ will be available, if at all, in the future. Additionally, since
the contracts would most likely include triggers and payouts based on
90
industry-wide losses, individual firms would face basis risk.”
2. Government as Lender of Last Resort
Professors Dwight Jaffee and Thomas Russell have proposed the
91
introduction of a temporary loan scheme for catastrophe insurers.
They argue that the financial system is no stranger to a program of
temporary government loans. Central banks, for example, have (at
least if one disregards the recent financial crisis) long guaranteed the
stability of the commercial banking system by acting as temporary
“lenders of last resort.” (Of course, there are differences between
banks and the government, but the authors argue that these are one

90. See JAFFEE, supra note 18, at 37–38.
91. DWIGHT JAFFEE & THOMAS RUSSELL, APRIA, FINANCING CATASTROPHE
INSURANCE: A NEW PROPOSAL 6–7 (2006); DWIGHT JAFFEE & THOMAS RUSSELL, NBER
INSURANCE PROJECT WORKSHOP, EXTREME EVENTS AND THE MARKET FOR TERRORIST
INSURANCE 24–25 (2002); Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Should Governments Provide
Catastrophe Insurance?, 3 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1, 4–6 (2006).
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of degree and not of kind.) Suppose, then, that public policy makers
decide to extend the lender-of-last-resort function to providers of
catastrophe insurance. As an insurance company which has just paid
out a large claim does not have the quantity or quality of assets of a
solvent bank, the public lending agency will need to offer unsecured
loans. This, in turn, will require that the public lender be the leading
creditor in the event of a bankruptcy. Under this approach, taxpayers
will bear credit risk, but this risk is likely to be smaller than the risk
they would bear if the government were to itself provide direct
insurance or reinsurance.
The purpose of such loans is to provide insurers with time to
access equity capital markets. Thus, the loans must be of short
duration, two to three years at maximum. Moreover, as the loans are
intended to overcome the problem of non-availability of capital, there
is no need to subsidize insurers, and the loans should be offered at
market price. Also, since the explicit purpose of the loans is to
temporarily provide policy-writing capacity, the borrowing insurance
company should be explicitly required to raise equity capital and
provide additional coverage during the loan period. The loan
agreement could explicitly provide additional incentives for firms to
do so, for example, by lowering the loan rate as the firms raise their
equity bases.
II. STIMULATING INSURABILITY: A NORMATIVE LAW-ANDECONOMICS ANALYSIS
Part I described the various ways in which government can and
does intervene in compensating victims of catastrophes. In this part,
we will provide a normative law-and-economics analysis of the
various forms of government intervention and assess their economic
92
efficiency. First, in Part II.A, we will show that many law-and92. The relatively modest form of government intervention in which the government
merely supports the private market (through, for example, tax exemptions), see supra Part I.A.,
does not need further discussion for the simple reason that the government in such cases does
not run any financial risk. The new forms of government intervention discussed in Part I.G will
also not be discussed any further. These interesting models have been suggested in the
literature, but they do not yet exist in practice and are therefore less appealing as subjects for
further analysis. The role of the government in simply providing an additional risk layer, see
supra Part I.F, will also not be discussed in more detail because government intervention in this
case is not related to stimulating insurability. Instead, in such cases, the government merely
provides supplementary compensation to the extent that the money provided as a result of the
(limited) liability of the licensee of a nuclear power plant does not suffice to compensate the
victims. In that respect, the government’s role is comparable to providing direct compensation
to victims of catastrophes—there is no relationship to insurance in either of the cases.
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economics scholars have described ex post relief as problematic.
Second, in Part II.B, we will argue that introducing mandatory
comprehensive insurance may be a better solution. Third, in Parts
II.C and II.D, we will focus on the potential role for the government
in insuring emerging catastrophe risks as a primary insurer and as a
reinsurer of last resort.
A. Direct Compensation to Victims of Catastrophes: Government as
Santa Claus
1. Political Inefficiencies
One way for the government to stimulate compensation for
victims of catastrophes is to simply take over the compensation
function and provide ex post relief to victims. As we described
93
above, this type of ex post relief can take different forms—it can
94
consist of a disaster compensation fund or simply of ad hoc
compensation whereby the government decides on the basis of the
nature and scope of the disaster how much relief to provide. Usually,
these forms of ex post relief provide lump-sum payments to victims
and are financed by the taxpayers.
However, a distinction should be made between government
intervention in the prevention of catastrophes—for example, by
building dikes against flooding—which usually takes place ex ante,
and a role of government in providing compensation, which takes
place ex post.
A positive aspect of ex post government intervention is that
“[t]he prospect of large-scale payouts in the aftermath of major losses
might . . . encourage the government to take cost-benefit justified
95
precautions long before disaster strikes.” This argument is
particularly strong in the case of terrorism. The goal of terrorist
attacks is often to disrupt society, and ex post relief may help restore

Government provision of an additional insurance layer is thus susceptible to roughly the same
law-and-economics objections as the provision of direct compensation; the only difference is
that when the government provides only an additional risk layer, at least some compensation is
still provided by the liable insurer.
93. See supra Introduction
94. See, e.g., Dagmar & Koch, supra note 24, at 7–12 (discussing the
Kataztrophenfondsgesetz in Austria, an administrative fund with state aid contributions for
catastrophe indemnification); Durant, supra note 25, at 38 (outlining the current patchwork
system for compensation in Belgium, which includes government intervention).
95. See Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—and Crime, 102
MICH. L. REV. 268, 310 (2003).
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the public trust. Moreover, terrorists may adopt adaptive strategies to
which governments can potentially react better than individuals—
there is little one can expect from civilians as far as taking preventive
measures is concerned. The same is obviously true of large-scale
infrastructural works that are necessary to prevent catastrophes.
These are typically public goods that would not be provided through
private action and may hence require government intervention.
Professor Ben Depoorter has argued that politicians may receive
too little reward from ex ante disaster-management policies and that
96
these policies may be undersupplied as a result. The problem is
exacerbated because political benefits of planning activities may be
97
shared with other levels of government. In contrast, the political
reward for ex post compensation may be very strong, and ex post
98
relief is thus likely to be oversupplied. This has also been confirmed
in other literature. Public choice theory shows that governments will
99
always tend to intervene when the number of victims is large.
Potential victims are, after all, voters, and governments will try to
seduce the largest number of electors in order to gain or maintain
100
power. “A political [and strategic] interest might thus be hidden
101
behind the argument of victim[] protection.” Second, public choice
theory also demonstrates that public intervention is costly. State
organization of compensation financing—especially through public
102
insurance pools—can be analogized to a bureaucracy. In that
respect, Professor Gordon Tullock shows that this type of scheme
103
might suffer from economic inefficiency. This inefficiency appears
to be due to internal rent-seeking activities, and, in case of public

96. Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply And Demand of Disaster
Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 112–13 (2006).
97. Id. at 110.
98. Id. at 104 (2006) (describing how this may have been the case after Hurricane Katrina).
99. See Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 167, 171–73 (1991) (arguing that government relief for risk actually “distorts”
incentives because it externalizes the cost of individual actions); see also Epstein, supra note 3,
at 293–96 (saying that, while viewed ex post the marginal dollar spent in relief after a
catastrophe has greater value to the recipients than it does to the tax-payers, viewed ex ante
such relief is less clearly efficient); Role for Government, supra note 4, at 49–50 (discussing the
crises with private insurance in the United States following the 2001 terrorist attacks).
100. BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 198.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J.
224, 230 (1967).
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104

insurance pools, due to capture of a monopolistic profit. Indeed,
economist Thomas Gerrett and Professor Russell Sobel showed that
disaster expenditures by FEMA are mostly politically motivated:
“[s]tates [that are] politically important to the president have a higher
rate of disaster declaration by the president, and disaster
expenditures are higher in states having congressional representation
105
on FEMA oversight committees.” Hence, Gerrett and Sobel argue
that “nearly half of all disaster relief is motivated politically rather
106
than by need.”
An additional problem arises when government compensation is
provided for victims of technological disasters—the compensation
favors not only the victims but also the injurers. Indeed, since
governments pay for the consequences of the risk generated by the
injurers, the injurers are relieved from the compensation charge. This
discharge corresponds to exoneration, thus creating a double
inefficiency. On the one hand, since injurers do not have to pay
compensation (partly or fully), government intervention has a
subsidizing character. This implicit subsidy might disturb the injurers’
incentives to care. Professors Karine Fiore and Michael Faure
illustrate this argument for the nuclear industry in France (and
elsewhere in Europe), where the state pays for a large share of
107
compensation in case of an accident. Of course, this problem does
not arise in the case of natural catastrophes or terrorist activities,
where no solvent injurer can be identified.
2. Incentive Problems
This part lists additional problems—other than the inefficiencies
discussed above—that law-and-economics scholars have identified
with respect to government provision of ex post relief to disaster
victims.

104. Obviously, the severity of the criticisms partially depends upon the nature of the
arrangement. To the extent that government relief can be structured to still provide some
incentives to the victims (for example, by including deductibles or by differentiating the amount
of compensation based on preventive measures taken by the victim) and that financing can to
some extent still be risk-based (although that is seldom the case), the criticisms may be less
serious.
105. Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster
Payments, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 496, 496 (2003).
106. Id.
107. Michael G. Faure & Karine Fiore, An Economic Analysis of the Nuclear Liability
Subsidy, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 432–36 (2009).
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First, since lump-sum government-relief payments usually do not
relate to risk, no incentives are provided to potential victims to take
effective preventive measures. Of course, whether it is realistic for the
victims to take preventive measures will very much depend upon the
nature of the disaster. Preventive measures that require a significant
ex ante investment of infrastructure will, for the public-good reason
discussed above, be primarily undertaken by government. For
example, taking structural measures to protect a country against
tsunamis or against terrorism risk is primarily a government task.
Individual potential victims can certainly take some protective
measures, not so much to prevent a disaster, but rather to limit the
damage it may cause. For example, flood damage can obviously be
prevented by not locating buildings in flood-prone areas.
Nevertheless, the government may be best situated to know the
location of these flood-prone areas and may use zoning regulations to
limit construction in those areas. Additionally, even when exposed to
flood risks, victims can still take preventive measures—for example,
in the case of flooding, by removing the most valuable household
objects from the cellar or ground floor. These measures may be
relatively limited compared to the impact of infrastructural works that
the government could undertake, but they remain important. The
problem—also called the “charity hazard” by Paul Raschky and
108
Professor Hannelore Weck-Hannemann
and as defined by
109
Professors Mark Browne and Robert Hoyt —is that ex post relief by
the government will not provide incentives to take those appropriate
preventive measures. The literature thus suggests that, via risk
differentiation, competitive insurance markets are better able to deal
110
with moral hazard and adverse selection.
A second problem is that victims may be counting on
government compensation, which may create an incentive not to

108. See Paul A. Raschky & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, Charity Hazard—A Real
Hazard to Natural Disaster Insurance, 7 NAT. HAZARDS 321, 322 (2007).
109. See id. at 322; see also Mark J. Browne & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for Flood
Insurance: Empirical Evidence, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 291, 293 (2000) (defining charity
hazard as “the tendency of an individual at risk not to procure insurance or other risk financing
as a result of a reliance on expected charity from others such as friends, family, community, nonprofit organizations, or a government emergency program”); Tracy Lewis & David Nickerson,
Self-Insurance Against Natural Disasters, 16 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 209, 209–10 (1989).
110. George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic Loss,
12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219, 222 (1996).
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111

purchase insurance, since victims can simply free-ride on the State.
In the words of Professor Christian Gollier, “[s]olidarity kills market
112
insurance.” Stephen Coate has linked the lack of insurance to the
113
generosity of the government. An experimental study of crop
insurance in the Netherlands also showed that the willingness of
producers to purchase private insurance (supported by the
government) was significantly negatively influenced by their belief
about the availability of government-supplied disaster relief in the
114
future. A similar conclusion was also recently reached based on
empirical research comparing compensation mechanisms available in
different countries after the August 2005 flood in Austria,
115
Switzerland, and the German state of Bavaria. The study argues
that there was a substantial charity hazard leading to lower amounts
of insurance purchased in Austria, where a disaster fund was
116
available. Participation in flood insurance was higher in Bavaria,
although it was the highest in the Swiss canton of Grison, which had
117
public insurance and mandatory participation.
Negative distributional effects are a related problem, as some
victims—who, for example, purchased houses at low prices in floodprone areas—may free-ride on other individuals (the general
118
taxpayers) who finance the ex post relief.
Ex post government compensation is therefore generally seen as
problematic by law-and-economics scholars. This criticism is nicely
expressed by the title of a work by Professor Richard Epstein, which
characterizes ex post relief as “Catastrophic Responses to
111. See, e.g., Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 281; see also Kaplow, supra note 99, at
167, 173 (exploring the notion that government relief may have an adverse effect on private
incentives to purchase insurance).
112. BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 207 (citing Christian Gollier, Some Aspects of the
Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance, CATASTROPHIC RISKS & INSURANCE 13, 25 (2005)).
113. Stephen Coate, Altruism, the Samaritan’s Dilemma and Government Transfer Policy,
85 AM. ECON. REV. 46, 46 (1995).
114. See Marcel A.P.M. van Asseldonk, Miranda P.M. Meuwissen & Ruud B.M. Huirne,
Belief in Disaster Relief and the Demand for a Public-Private Insurance Programme, 24 REV.
AGRIC. ECON 196 (2002) (discussing how free government relief in the past disincentivized
farmers in the Dutch crop insurance program).
115. See Paul A. Raschky et al., Risikotransfersysteme für Naturkatastrophen in
Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz—Ein theoretischer und empirischer Vergleich, 77
VIERTELJAHRSHEFTE ZUR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG 53 (2008) (comparing “risk transfer,” or
insurance, systems in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland after they were affected by floods in
2005).
116. Id. at 66–67.
117. Id.
118. BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 207.
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119

Catastrophic Risks.” Weighing these disadvantages against the
potential benefits of such an approach—that is, providing incentives
to the government to take measures aimed at the prevention of
disasters—the disadvantages seem to be overwhelming. It is not clear
to what extent the payment of ex post relief effectively incentivizes
120
the government to take preventive measures.
Moreover, as
Professor Depoorter has recently showed, the prospect of having to
pay ex post relief in the future apparently does not encourage
politicians to invest in disaster-prevention mechanisms for the simple
reason that the political benefits of the two are different, which
results in an oversupply of ex post relief and undersupply of disaster
121
preparation measures.
However, as we have shown above, notwithstanding the many
arguments against ex post relief, in practice governments in many
legal systems cannot resist the temptation to provide generous
122
amounts of ad hoc or structural relief after disasters have occurred.
As described above, ex post relief may provide large political benefits
to politicians. Professor Jack Hirschleifer has stated that providing
compensation after the occurrence of a disaster is so politically
attractive that the government will invariably find it impossible to
123
124
resist payment, and this point has been echoed by others. As a
result, in many countries the compensation for victims of catastrophes
125
is a topic of discussion and legal reform. One of the issues addressed
is whether the government can play a role that is less distortive and
provides better incentives for prevention.

119. Epstein, supra note 3, at 297–98.
120. BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 208.
121. See Depoorter, supra note 98, at 103–04.
122. See, e.g., Monti & Chiaves, supra note 46, at 169 (“[E]very year the Italian
Government spends on average 3.5 to 4 billion euros to indemnify damages caused by
catastrophic events.”).
123. See Hirshleifer, supra note 51, at 146–47 (“In the author’s opinion, in the absence of an
insurance program, it will be politically impossible for the government not to compensate for
damage.”).
124. See Peter Siegelman, A New Old Look at Terrorism Insurance: Jack Hirschleifer’s War
Damage Insurance After 50 Years, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 19, 24 (2002).
125. See, e.g., Véronique Bruggeman et al., The Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophe
Risks?, 35 THE GENEVA PAPERS 369, 369–83 (2010); FAURE & HARTLIEF, supra note 30, at 1–
2.
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B. Mandatory Comprehensive Insurance: An Attractive Solution
One possible government intervention to facilitate the provision
of catastrophe insurance—in particular to stimulate the demand for
this type of insurance—is to make insurance mandatory. While such
compulsory insurance does not go totally undisputed (especially in
126
cases where it would also force individuals who run no risk at all to
purchase insurance coverage), there seems to be support for such a
127
regulatory policy in law-and-economics scholarship.
Many scholars—particularly Professor Kunreuther—have argued
in favor of compulsory first-party (in other words, bought by potential
victims) insurance for property damage caused by all kinds of natural
128
disasters. This model, whereby the duty to insure against disasters is
combined with insurance against a high-probability, low-damage
129
event, is also supported by behavioral literature.
Further,
compulsory insurance is thought to play an important role in
130
improving hazard perception.
Professor Kip Viscusi has recently supported the idea of
mandatory disaster insurance. He defends this approach based on the
131
assumption that politicians are unable to deny post-disaster aid.
132
Comprehensive insurance may be an attractive alternative, which
133
would at least foster self-protection and insurance.
However, even if the lack of demand for disaster insurance could
be solved by mandating the purchase of insurance, problems can also

126. For example, an owner of a tenth-floor apartment has hardly any risk of suffering
flood damage.
127. Mandatory disaster insurance is not the central focus of this paper. For more details,
see generally Faure & Bruggeman, supra note 6; see also Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at
304.
128. See generally Howard Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance, 11
J.L. & ECON. 133, 142–63 (1968).
129. See id. at 159–60 (discussing how, in this system, the isolated homeowner without
insurance “would simply be considered a gambler who lost”).
130. Id.
131. W. Kip Viscusi, The Hold-Up Problem: Why it is Urgent to Rethink the Economics of
Disaster Insurance Protection, in THE IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST: MAKING DECISIONS IN A
DANGEROUS WORLD 142, 142–48 (Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Paul Slovic eds., 2010) (“Saying
that one will not support assistance after a future hurricane may, of course, be a form of
hypothetical trash talk. It is a very different matter to actually deny assistance once there are
identified victims and their stories are featured on the evening news.”).
132. Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Insurance Decision-Making and Market
Behaviour, 1 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 63, 117 (2005).
133. See Viscusi, supra note 131, at 146–48 (offering policies to foster self-protection and
insurance).
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arise on the supply side, especially given the “difficult-to-predict”
134
nature of catastrophes. As pointed out in Part I, the Solvency II
Directive admittedly mitigates the problem of insolvency of the
insurer, but a risk remains that there will not be sufficient resources.
Hence, a question arises: What is the government’s role when the
amount of damage caused by a disaster is higher than normal
insurance coverage? As we argued above, any alternative is better
than providing direct compensation to disaster victims. One
possibility, discussed in Part II.C, is to have the government act as the
primary insurer; another, discussed in Part II.D, is to have the
government serve as a reinsurer of last resort.
C. Government Acting as the Primary Insurer: The Case of Efficient
Monopolies
The increasing dissatisfaction with outright ex post relief
combined with the feeling that catastrophic losses may be so large
that traditional insurance markets may not be able to provide full
coverage has led to the development of new structures. On the one
hand, insurance markets would be used to the extent possible and, on
the other hand, the government would intervene to support insurance
135
markets when the markets fail.
These kinds of structures are increasingly welcomed by law-andeconomics scholars. We will now look at these types of government
intervention in a more integrative way. First, we will address the role
of the government as primary insurer. Initially, this approach only
seems effective in cases where insurance markets would not emerge.
However, various scholars have stressed that under particular
circumstances, government monopolies for disaster insurance may in
fact provide coverage at lower prices than the competitive market.
1. The Swiss Example
In Switzerland, home insurance has developed along two lines. In
nineteen of the twenty-six cantons, insurance is offered by a regional
136
monopoly and is compulsory. Homeowners are obliged to buy

134. For a more detailed analysis of problems on the supply side, see Christian Gollier,
Some Aspects of Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance, in CATASTROPHE RISKS AND
INSURANCE 13–30 (OECD Publishing 2006); see also FROOT, supra note 7.
135. THE GENEVA ASS’N, RISK & INSURANCE ECONOMICS, ANNUAL REPORT 2011/2012
49 (2012).
136. Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, The Limits Of Competition: Housing Insurance in
Switzerland, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1111, 1113–14 (1996).
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137

housing insurance against fire and natural disasters. However, the
insurance covers only these two types of damages and does not
138
extend to acts of terrorism. In the remaining seven cantons,
insurance is not offered by public monopolies, but by the private
139
This dichotomy allows us to compare two different
market.
approaches to home insurance within a single country.
The Swiss example is of course an exception rather than the rule.
Nevertheless, the general finding is quite striking—namely, in the
cantons where insurance is offered by state monopolies, the premium
140
rates are lower than the rates in cantons with private insurance. The
following diagram compares premium prices of cantonal and private
insurers between 1984 and 1995 and also provides an overview of the
different components of the premiums.

cts/1000 SFr. SI

120
100

6
13.6

80

17

60
40
20

14
13.5
10.6
6.1

Prevention
Reserves
Commissions

58.2

Administrative costs
Claims

32.9

0
Cantonal Insurers
Total: 63,1

Private Insurers
Total: 108.8
141

Fig. 1. Premium Rates Comparison (Fire and natural disasters, 1984-1995)

This overview shows that, especially with regard to
administrative costs and commissions, there is a huge discrepancy

137. Id.
138. See id. (discussing the role compulsory state-supplied insurance plays in housing and
natural damage insurance markets).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1114–16.
141. Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Assessing the Efficiency of an
Insurance Provider—A Measurement Error Approach, 30 GENEVA RISK & INS. REV. 15, 18
(2005).
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between the two types of insurers. While the private insurers spend
thirty-one cents per 1000 square feet of housing stock insured for
commissions and administrative costs, the cantonal insurers spend
less than one-fifth of this amount for the same items. This difference
can be explained by the costs faced by private insurers to manage
142
their network of sales agents. Since insurance is offered by a
multitude of insurers, sales agents may have difficulties getting new
customers. Commissions paid to the sales agents can serve as a
motivation for these representatives to sell more insurance. These
commissions for sales representatives of course do not need to be
143
paid by state monopolies providing compulsory insurance.
Admittedly, a potential downside of the system is that the state
monopoly has no real incentives to keep costs low. However, as
shown in the diagram above, insurance is still cheaper in cantons
where insurance is not offered on the private market.
Administrative costs alone do not explain the difference in
premium rates between government-monopoly and private-market
cantons—as shown in the diagram above, the damage rates also differ
to a significant extent. Contrary to commentary from the private
insurance sector, this difference cannot be explained solely by
exogenous factors. Damage rates may still differ in cantons which are
sufficiently homogeneous based on geographic proximity and housing
144
structure similarity—such as Geneva and Lausanne.
In this
example, damage rates in Lausanne are only half as high as in
145
Geneva. In the latter canton, there is no government supplier,
146
whereas in Lausanne insurance is provided by a cantonal monopoly.
This difference in damage rates has to be taken together with the
higher amount spent by the cantonal insurers on prevention. This
147
provides for a real-life application of the Coase Theorem —in the
cantons where insurance is provided by state monopolies, higher
amounts are spent on prevention, which is mirrored in lower damage
148
rates.
142. See von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 139, at 1116 (discussing the lower administrative
costs).
143. See id., supra note 139, at 1117.
144. Id. at 1116.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. According to the Coase Theorem, trading in externalities between different bargaining
parties will, in the absence of transaction costs, lead to an efficient outcome, regardless of the
initial allocation of property rights.
148. Id. at 1116.
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Another observation that explains both the incentives for better
prevention and the advantages of a public monopoly in this sector has
been brought forward by Professor Winand Emons. Professor Emons
highlights the importance of certain requirements that must be met in
149
order for a house to be insured. Compliance with the requirements
150
is monitored by insurance companies.
Because insurance is
provided by one public monopoly, the result of such testing is rather
straightforward: either the house passes the test and insurance is
acquired, or the homeowner must make changes to the house to fulfill
151
the required standard. In contrast, in the case of multiple insurers,
the homeowner might be tempted to try to obtain insurance from
another company instead of trying to bring his house up to the
152
required standard set by the first insurer. This leads to a decrease in
153
prevention costs and eventually to an inefficient market.
The Swiss case has been accepted almost unequivocally as an
example of regional monopolies that operate more efficiently than
the private sector. The authors have been able to identify only one
scholar, Professor Bernd Schips, who has brought forward an
154
opposing analysis. Schips explains that the problem with the
cantonal monopolies in Switzerland is that political choices do not
155
always reflect economic efficiency criteria. He is afraid that the
cantonal monopolies are structured according to criteria that serve
the political interests of the respective parties and not according to
156
efficient objective criteria. In his calculation, it is actually the private
157
insurers and not the monopolies that offer better prices. Rejecting
Professor Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg’s analysis, Schips concludes
that the cantonal monopolies are not in an exceptional position and
cannot be regarded as operating more efficiently than the private

149. See Winand Emons, Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies, 49 J. INDUS.
ECON. 247, 251–55 (2001) (discussing the requirments used to test insurability).
150. Id. at 252.
151. See id. at 253 (analyzing actions a homeowner can take to qualify for insurance
coverage).
152. See id. at 255–57 (introducing competition into the analysis).
153. Id. at 249–50.
154. Bernd Schips, Ökonomische Argumente für wirksamen Wettbewerb auch im
Versicherungszweig ‘Gebäudefeuer- und Gebäudeelementarschäden (1995) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with ETH Zuerich).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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158

insurers. The difference between these analyses, however, can be
sufficiently explained by the application of different statistical
159
methods. Given that there is not one paper that supports Schips’
analysis, the Swiss example can indeed be accepted as a case of
160
efficient monopolies.
2. A German Example: The Third Non-Life Insurance Directive
and its Influence on the Insurance Market in Baden-Württemberg
That home insurance in the majority of the Swiss cantons is still
provided by regional monopolies is also due to the fact that
Switzerland is still not a member of the European Union. The drive
for liberalization and privatization within the European Union would
161
certainly have made it difficult to uphold this system. For example,
in Germany, the introduction of the Third Non-Life Insurance
162
Directive
ended the life of several existing state insurance
monopolies. The transition to market competition in the home
insurance sector in Baden-Württemberg nicely illustrates the
downsides of this shift. Because the demonopolization led to a huge
increase in premiums, the Baden-Württemberg example fits well into
163
the lessons learned from the Swiss case. Karl Epple and Reinhard
Schäfer have also identified similarities between the two cases with
regard to the calculation of premium rates, and pointed out that the
164
state insurer need not pay for advertising and sales representatives.
3. Efficient Monopolies - Delineating Key Factors
Having given two examples in which state monopolies seem to be
more efficient in the insurance sector than private insurers, this part
identifies the underlying core variables. The experiences in
Switzerland and Germany will be used to outline some conditions
under which government insurance may enhance welfare.

158. Id.
159. See id. at 31; see also Gebhard Kirchgässner, On the Efficiency of a Public Insurance
Monopoly: The Case of Housing Insurance in Switzerland, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
CHOICE 221, 226 (Pio Baake & Rainald Borck, eds., 2007).
160. See Kirchgässner, supra note 159, at 226.
161. Id. at 224.
162. Council Directive 92/49/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 228/1) (EC) (directing EC countries to end
state non-life insurance policies to provide for a freer market).
163. See Karl Epple & Reinhard Schäfer, The Transition from Monopoly to Competition:
The Case of Housing Insurance in Baden-Württemberg, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1123, 1129–31
(1996).
164. See id. at 1129.
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i. The Compulsory Nature of Insurance Provided by State
Monopolies—Comprehensive Coverage and Adverse Selection
As stated above, in the nineteen cantons in Switzerland where
insurance is provided by regional monopolies, being insured is
compulsory. Combined with the fact that there will only be one
insurer from whom the customer can buy insurance, this has two
major advantages. First, it prevents adverse selection. A major
challenge faced by insurance companies is to avoid ending up with
only the bad risks after the good ones leave the pool. Where a state
monopoly provides compulsory insurance, automatic risk
165
diversification takes place. This successfully fights the problem of
adverse selection. In contrast, a regional monopoly offering
compulsory insurance is better able to offer more comprehensive
166
coverage—it can cover risks such as flooding or earthquakes.
ii. The Role of Prevention
The special role that prevention plays under the regime offered
by the cantonal insurers in Switzerland has already been discussed
above. Prevention will reduce claims, enabling the insurers to keep
167
premiums low. It is an absolute prerequisite that the insurer plays
168
an active role in preventive measures. This is one of the main
lessons from the Swiss example. By being actively in charge of
organizing and financing prevention efforts, the cantons have found
169
an original solution to the problem of prevention. The Swiss model
seems to work because the cantons are liable for damage payments as
insurers, and the model provides the cantons with incentives to use
their public powers to require preventive efforts. Of course,
preventive efforts are also required from individual insured
homeowners. Compared to a private market with multiple insurers,
cantonal monopolies are thereby in a better position to enforce
170
preventive efforts.
The importance of active involvement is further demonstrated in
Germany. Despite investing huge amounts in prevention, the
monopolies never played an active role in preventive measures. Von
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 1127.
See id. at 1125.
See von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 139, at 1116.
Id. at 1117.
THOMAS VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, EFFICIENT MONOPOLIES – THE LIMITS OF
COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN PROPERTY INSURANCE MARKET 106 (2004).
170. See Emons, supra note 153, at 248–49.
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Ungern-Sternberg cites this inactivity as one of the reasons that the
171
state monopolies in Germany did not survive.
iii. Non-Profit Organization
The form of the institution providing insurance is also relevant
for a system of efficient state monopolies. Specifically, insurers must
172
be non-profit organizations.
Non-profits are not required to
generate or distribute revenue. The non-distribution constraint allows
them to keep sufficient capital reserves while also keeping premium
rates low.
iv. Yardstick Competition
Finally, regional monopolies will only provide insurance
coverage in an efficient way if competition between different
monopolies still exists. This sounds contradictory. However, within
Switzerland there is a form of competition between the different
cantonal monopolies. This form of yardstick competition should not
be regarded as competition in stricto sensu but should be understood
as a means of comparison between the various regional monopolies
and the services they offer. This has positive effects on innovation and
efficiency because one regional monopoly can adapt based on the
decisions of another regional monopoly. Having only one state
monopoly would destroy this advantage and make the system
173
unworkable.
D. Government as a Reinsurer of Last Resort
In this particular case, government intervention is geared
towards supporting the traditional insurance market, given the
market’s inability to supply coverage in cases of large-scale disasters.
It is well-known that disaster insurers fear not only the potential
magnitude of damage of a given catastrophe, but also the
174
unpredictable nature of a catastrophe. The basic idea is that, given
the problems in supplying catastrophe insurance, governments can
play a positive role by stimulating insurance markets (and thus

171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. at 248 n.2.
See Kirchgaessner, supra note 159, at 236.
Id. at 239–40.
Kunreuther, supra note 36, at 178–90.
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applying differentiated premiums) and keeping disaster insurance
175
affordable.
While there are strong arguments in favor of this type of
government intervention, the literature on the topic is quite divided.
Some have qualified these types of interventions as “private- and
176
public- insurance responses,” others have more generally examined
“public-private partnerships” consisting of various layers to provide
177
comprehensive insurance against natural disasters.
1. Drawbacks
Both in law and economics, there is criticism of the facilitative
178
role of the government in stimulating insurance markets. Gron and
Sykes argue that it would be unjust for the government to provide
179
(re)insurance at a lower price than the market price. This would
give the wrong signal to the market as far as stimulating insurability is
concerned. Ad hoc solutions where compensation is provided to
accident victims on an ex post basis are preferable because market
participants would not believe that compensation is guaranteed by
the government.
Dutch lawyers Ammerlaan and van Boom have been critical of
the Dutch government’s participation in reinsurance against
terrorism. They argue that the premium demanded by the
government is incorrect and that it is not the State’s task to provide
180
private insurance. Damage caused by terrorism should instead be
181
financed through the public purse.
It is striking that most of this criticism is not addressed against
government intervention, but is based on the assumption that the
government will not charge premiums that properly reflect market
175. See generally Howard Kunreuther, Reducing Losses From Catastrophic Risks Through
Long-Term Insurance And Mitigation, 75 SOC. RES. 95 (2008).
176. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 278 (discussing government-provided
compensation in catastrophes, especially with respect to terrorism risk).
177. See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 72, at 112–13.
178. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Ronald J. Daniels, Rationales and Instruments for
Government Intervention in Natural Disasters, in ON RISK AND DISASTER – LESSONS FROM
HURRICANE KATRINA 89 (Daniels et al. eds., University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
179. See Gron & Sykes, supra note 4, at 458 (questioning the wisdom of U.S. government
insurance of airlines, noting that the government becomes a problem rather than a solution by
subsidizing insurance and allowing airlines to externalize their risks).
180. Karin Ammerlaan & Willem van Boom, De Nederlandse Herverzekeringsmaatschappij
voor Terrorismeschaden en de rol van de overheid bij het vergoeden van terreurschade
NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 45/46: 2330–39 (2003).
181. Id.
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prices. It is a criticism shared by Levmore and Logue, who argue that
the reinsurer of last resort regime only has its desired effect when it
182
involves a substantial subsidy.
They are skeptical of market
intervention for terrorism insurance, arguing that “the market would
likely have been able to provide the necessary coverage” even
183
without the intervention.
2. Advantages
The arguments in favor of intervention are the mirror image of
those against: assuming that capacity on the private insurance market
is severely lacking, insurance coverage for disasters would simply not
184
develop without government intervention. On the condition that the
government charges an actuarially fair premium for its intervention,
government reinsurance is an adequate resolution to the
185
uninsurability problem.
Moreover, this type of government
intervention has the advantage of avoiding ex post relief sponsored
through the public purse.
Where the government acts as reinsurer, those who actually
cause harm or bear risk can pay the premium, thus facilitating market
solutions, providing incentives for prevention to potential victims, and
186
avoiding the negative redistribution from tax payers to victims.
“Thus a State intervention as reinsurer may avoid ‘catastrophic
187
responses to catastrophic risks.’” This is further supported by the
fact that the government can diversify the risks over the entire
population and spread past losses to future generations. This creates a
form of cross-time diversification, which the private market could not
188
achieve.
Additionally, government participation in insurance
programs is especially crucial in the context of terrorism, where the
risk of terrorist attacks is partly under the government’s control and

182. Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 304 (arguing that without a meaningful subsidy,
disaster insurance would still not be “available”).
183. Id. at 311.
184. See Kunreuther, supra note 36, at 180–83; Harrington, supra note 38, at 43–45;
Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 33, at 167.
185. Faure, supra note 3, at 358.
186. Michael Faure & Klaus Heine, Insurance Against Financial Crises, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. &
BUS. 117, 129 (2011).
187. Id. (citing Epstein, supra note 3, at 287); see also Kunreuther, supra note 72, at 113
(arguing that a government role in supply side assistance may avoid the inefficiencies and
inequities associated with disaster assistance).
188. See Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Challenges for Terrorism Risk
Insurance in the United States, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 201, 210 (2004).
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the government often has more information on ongoing terrorist
189
activities.
Notwithstanding the objections of some free-market scholars, the
examples provided in Part I demonstrate the increasing popularity of
government intervention in providing disaster insurance, either as
reinsurer or primary insurer. These constructions have the advantage
190
of leaving more of a place for market solutions. We will take a
critical look at some of these constructions in Part III.
III. CONDITIONS FOR A GOVERNMENT ROLE AS (RE)INSURER OF
CATASTROPHIC RISKS
The literature arguing in favor and against a government role as
(re)insurer for catastrophic risks implicitly formulates a variety of
conditions. In this section, we will examine the particular conditions
that lead to the most efficient outcomes.
A. Non-distortive Government Intervention
Whether or not markets would develop without intervention is,
of course, hard to judge and is largely an empirical question. For
example, as far as terrorism is concerned, one can argue that there is
overwhelming empirical evidence that after 9/11, insurance
191
companies began cancelling terrorism coverage. However, that does
not necessarily mean that without government intervention the
development of a market solution would have been impossible. The
danger that insurers will overstate the uninsurability argument is
always present since a partial government takeover of risk may suit
192
their interests. Accordingly, arguments provided by insurers must
be viewed with a degree of skepticism.

189. See generally Howard Kunreuther and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Insurability of (Mega-)
Terrorism Risk: Challenges and Perspectives, in 9 TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE IN OECD
COUNTRIES 107 (OECD Publ’g, 2005) (arguing that the characteristics of terrorism require
government participation in any terrorism insurance program to be based on public-private
partnerships).
190. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 303.
191. See Robert P. Hartwig, The Impact of the September 11 Attacks on the American
Insurance Industry, in INSURANCE AND SEPTEMBER 11 ONE YEAR AFTER: IMPACT, LESSONS
AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES 10, 29 (Patrick M. Liedtke & Christophe Courbage eds., 2002).
192. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 298.
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B. Charging Risk-based Premiums
Many law-and-economics scholars stress that insurance rates
193
should reflect the risk as closely as possible, because the premium
provides a signal to individuals of the risks they actually face. A
system of risk-based premiums will provide incentives to invest in
194
cost-effective loss prevention measures.
State-provided insurance should thus charge risk-based
195
premiums to reflect the actual risk. If the government does not
receive any premium for providing (re)insurance coverage,
commercial reinsurers could not compete with the government, and
196
the government-provided (re)insurance would amount to a subsidy.
In some countries, this could be considered state aid for which
197
particular procedures must be followed.
C. Stimulating Market Solutions or Providing Efficient Government
Insurance
(Re)insurance by the government should be organized in such a
way that market solutions are still stimulated. If government
intervention is too “simple,” and imposes artificially low costs, it
provides no incentives for the market to develop its own solutions.
However, one should be slightly careful with this recommendation,
taking into account the Swiss example. As discussed above, disaster
insurance in the majority of Swiss cantons is offered by regional
monopolies. This empirical evidence shows that the government
monopoly may be superior when it is able to provide insurance more
efficiently than the market due to lower costs of risk differentiation
(after liberalization).

193. See, e.g., WHARTON RISK MGMT. & DECISION PROCESSES CTR., MANAGING LARGESCALE RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES: INSURING, MITIGATING AND FINANCING
RECOVERY FROM NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 363 (Wharton Risk Mgmt. &
Decision Processes Ctr. ed., 2008).
194. Kunreuther, supra note 72, at 111.
195. Id.
196. Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 188, at 204; Levmore & Logue, supra note
95, at 304.
197. See FAURE & HEINE, supra note 33, at 19 (listing five criteria to determine when a
national subsidy or regulation qualifies as state aid).
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198

An important aspect of stimulating the market, rather than
distorting it, is leaving the individual insuree with the freedom to
decide whether or not to use State (re)insurance. Since the State
should charge a (re)insurance premium that mimics the market, this
freedom would allow an insuree to look for cheaper alternatives.
Requiring individuals to use State-provided (re)insurance could
endanger competition on the insurance markets.
E. Temporary Character
In principle, government intervention should also have a
temporary character (there should be so-called “sunset provisions”),
because permanent intervention could have a negative effect on
competition. This, of course, only holds true if it is assumed that the
failure of ordinary (re)insurance markets is caused by exceptional
circumstances (such as the uncertainties that arose after 9/11).
IV. A TEST
In Part I, we presented various types of government intervention
that might stimulate insurability of catastrophic risks. At the end of
that part, we mentioned our particular interest in models in which the
government acts as a primary insurer, or as a reinsurer of last resort.
We will now examine a few arrangements in which the government
aims to stimulate insurability and apply the conditions discussed in
Part III for efficient government intervention. We specifically
examine intervention that solves problems on the supply side of the
catastrophe insurance market.
It is not possible within the scope of this paper to critically
analyze all of the various arrangements that exist in practice, some of
which we presented in Part I. Accordingly, we have chosen specific
arrangements that we consider representative of a particular
compensation model. In Part IV.A, we will describe different kinds of
government interventions. First, we look at two cases in which the
government acts as a primary insurer—the California Earthquake
Authority (CEA) and the Consorcio de Compensacióon de Seguros
(CCS). Next, we examine a case where the government acts as
reinsurer of last resort, mostly for natural catastrophes, the French
Caisse Central de Réassurance (CCR). The role of government as a
198. Part III.D borrows from a book written by one of the authors, see BRUGGEMAN, supra
note 8, at 201. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted.
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reinsurer of last resort has recently received a lot of attention because
this model is often followed in the case of terrorism.
Finally, Part IV.B will then compare the different arrangements
within the context of the conditions set out in Part III.
A. Description
1. Government as Primary Insurer: CEA
The CEA represents an instance where the government stepped
into the private insurance market and assumed the risk of a potential
natural catastrophe. The CEA is a privately funded organization
199
managed by the State of California.
The organization was
established in September 1996, after the 1994 Northridge Earthquake,
in order to sell residential earthquake insurance policies through
participating insurance companies and encourage Californians to
200
reduce their risk of earthquake losses. The CEA currently has a
claims-paying capacity that exceeds nine billion dollars and writes off
201
seventy percent of earthquake premiums. The CEA provides for
202
deductibles of ten or fifteen percent.
The State of California requires insurers doing business in the
State to offer earthquake coverage in homeowners’ policies, either
203
directly or through the CEA. The CEA is empowered to set
premiums and to bear risks, but a so-called “mini-policy” lays down
204
which classes of real estate losses are covered. In addition, the
205
premiums must be set on an actuarial basis. In practice, the quoted
CEA premiums have been tempered so that regional price
differences are moderated. The CEA may purchase reinsurance, but
206
it does not have access to public funds. As a result, CEA resources
are only adequate to compensate an event which is double the size of

199. Frequently
Asked
Questions,
CAL.
EARTHQUAKE
AUTH.,
http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/index.aspx?id=78&pid=1 (last visited Nov. 26, 2012).
200. Id.
201. CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE AUTHORITY: AT-AGLANCE (2011), available at http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/UserFiles/File/Release/
CEA%20AT%20a%20Glance%20for%202011%20FINAL%20101411-1.pdf.
202. Insurance
Policy
Information,
CAL.
EARTHQUAKE
AUTH.,
http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/Ceapolicyinformation.aspx?id=2&pid=2 (last visited Dec.
3, 2012).
203. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 199.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 74, at 39–41.
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207

the Northridge Earthquake. Beyond that level, policyholders will
208
only receive partial compensation.
Participation in the CEA is voluntary—companies may and do
compete with the CEA, although this competition is mainly limited to
209
low-risk locations. The CEA charges considerable premiums and
many homeowners find these too high relative to the coverage
provided. Consequently, the percentage of Californians with
earthquake coverage (through the CEA or a private insurer) declined
210
from 33% in 1996 to 12% in 2010. The CEA has been criticized for
211
both its high deductibles and low compensation amounts.
2. The Government as Primary Insurer: CCS
The publicly administered disaster financing program CCS was
founded in 1954 as a corporation providing insurance against
“extraordinary risks”—namely natural disasters and risks with “social
212
repercussions” such as terrorism and riots. It also covers personal
damage for extraordinary events taking place abroad if the insured
213
resides habitually in Spain. The Spanish program offers a good
example of a government collecting a fee or premium in exchange for
the provision of insurance coverage.
This extraordinary risk coverage is a “mandatory additional
coverage added to fire and natural perils, motor and railway vehicles
214
and other property damage policies.” The extra CCS premium is
automatically included in the base policy’s premium and varies
according to the type of policy offered, although it reflects the base
215
rate charged on the primary policy.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Compare CAL. DEP’T OF INS., Earthquake Premium and Policy Count Data Call:
Summary of 2010 Residential & Commercial Market Totals (CAL. DEP’T OF INS., 2011), with
CAL. DEP’T OF INS., Summary of 1996: Residential Market Totals (CAL. DEP’T OF INS., 2002),
available
at
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0200-studies-reports/0300-earthquakestudy/index.cfm.
211. See e.g., Insure your Home Against Natural Disasters, U.S NEWS. (Nov. 2, 2012),
http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2012/11/02/how-to-insure-your-homeagainst-hurricanes-and-other-natural-disasters.
212. Paul K. Freeman & Kathryn Scott, Comparative Analysis of Large-Scale Catastrophe
Compensation Schemes, in 8 CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE 187, 201 (OECD Publ’g,
2005).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.

Faure (Do Not Delete)

226

1/7/2013 7:51 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 23:185

Prior to 1987, disaster insurance premiums were calculated as a
percentage of property damage insurance premiums. This meant that
the premium income was influenced by events unrelated to disaster
insurance. In 1987, the CCS began setting its own premium, which is
not risk-related and is equal for the entire country. For example, the
extra premium for a personal insurance policy amounts to 0.005 per
216
mille.
“CCS payments are subsidiary to payments made by the private
insurance industry” and the Consorcio only pays if the risk was not
covered by private insurance (for example, for the poor who did not
buy insurance) or if the private insurance company fails to pay due to
217
insolvency. Typically, domestic insurers in Spain do not cover
extraordinary risks, but issue policy documentation clearly stating
that such losses are the responsibility of the Consorcio, to whom
218
relevant claims should be addressed.
Following Spain’s accession to the European Union in December
1991, the legal nature of the CCS changed from being a State
monopoly to a public business institution attached to the Ministry of
219
Economy and Finance. The CCS now has its own legal capabilities
220
with full capacity to act and assets independent from the State. In
addition, given the unique characteristics of the Consorcio, especially
its high loss potential and very nature as a public entity, it is
absolutely necessary for the Consorcio to count on an unlimited State
guarantee. Nevertheless, the organizational structure and financial
management of its resources has enabled the CCS to meet its claims
obligations without making use of this guarantee in the more than
221
half-century of its existence.
Following 9/11 and the March 11 attacks in Madrid, which led to
a hard cut in cover for non-passenger third-party liability concerning
the risk of terrorism, the Spanish government asked the Consorcio to

216. Riesgos Extraordinarios: El Recargo y su Tarifa, CONSORCIO DE COMPENSACION DE
SEGUROS, http://www.consorseguros.es/web/guest/ad_re_er (last visited Sept. 19, 2012)
(discussing additional premiums for personal, property, home, business, car, and infrastructure
insurance).
217. Freeman & Scott, supra note 229, at 201.
218. Id. (adding that “[d]eductibles for property loss amount to 1% of the insured total and
a minimum of €150.25”).
219. Ignacio Machetti, The Spanish Experience in the Management of Extraordinary Risks,
Including Terrorism, in 8 CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE 337, 339 (OECD Publ’g,
2005).
220. Id.
221. See id. at 339–40.
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222

cover that risk on behalf of the State. The CCS fulfilled this task up
to October 31, 2002, when coverage became available on the private
223
market.
In addition, the Spanish Association of Insurance
Undertakings signed an agreement with the CCS under which the
Consorcio would cover the business interruption risk of companies
224
freely joining the agreement as reinsurer. This agreement was in
force until business interruption became integrated in the
225
extraordinary risks coverage system.
3. The Government as Reinsurer of Last Resort: CCR

226

France has installed a publicly owned reinsurance company, the
227
CCR. In the French system, reinsurance is not compulsory, and
insurers are free to contract with other private reinsurance
companies. However, reinsurance with the state is particularly
attractive, both because of the relatively low premiums it charges and
because it can offer unlimited coverage resulting from a State
guarantee in the event that the CCR exhausts its resources. A CCR
official noted that insurance companies must transfer half of their
natural catastrophe risk to the CCR in order to be covered under the
228
State guarantee. The State thus intervenes as a reinsurer, or, more
correctly, as a retrocessionaire of the CCR. In exchange for this State
guarantee, the CCR pays a premium to the State, exactly as it would
have done if it was protecting itself through an ordinary reinsurer
(although the latter could not have delivered an unlimited guarantee).
The reinsurance program is set up to allow insurers to manage
policyholders’ claims, since they have the best claims-paying
experience and expertise. Coverage from the CCR takes effect after
229
the insured pays a certain deductible.
222. Id. at 340.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Part IV.A.3 borrows from a book written by one of the authors, see BRUGGEMAN,
supra note 8, at 309–12. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted.
227. Decree No. 82-706 of 10 August 1982 on the Reinsurance Operations for the Natural
Catastrophe Risks by the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance. Application of Article 4 of the Act
No. 82-600 of 13 July 1982, JORF 11 August 1982.
228. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-199, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: CATASTROPHE RISK
U.S. AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO INSURE NATURAL CATASTROPHE AND TERRORISM
RISKS 34 (2005).
229. The CCR’s coverage for natural disasters is unlimited because of the State guarantee.
The deductible under the CCR reinsurance contract, therefore, represents the maximum
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Insurance companies that decide to utilize the state reinsurer are
offered two types of contracts: quota-share contracts and stop-loss
contracts. With a quota-share contract, the insurer cedes a certain
proportion of the collected premiums to the reinsurer. In return, the
reinsurer undertakes the payment of the same proportion of the
losses. The reinsurer will then truly follow the fortunes of the insurer,
since the latter has to cede a percentage of each of the policies in its
portfolio. The risk of adverse selection is hereby avoided. The
proportional coverage could vary between forty and sixty percent. On
the other hand, with a stop-loss contract, the reinsurance company
covers all claims that exceed an agreed upon multiple of annual
premium income. The insurer will then be protected against the risk
of multiple claims. In order to prevent insurers from buying their risksharing coverage from private reinsurers and using the CCR only for
stop-loss cover, the two contracts were tied: stop-loss contracts were
only offered to those insurance companies who also bought quotashare contracts from the CCR with a minimum participation of 40
percent. Jametti and von Ungern-Sternberg conclude that the
combination of these two types of reinsurance necessarily implies that
CCR (and ultimately the tax-payer) will bear most of the cost when a
230
large-scale disaster occurs.
In the first twenty years of its existence, the CCR did not
accumulate any substantial level of reserves, despite the fact that the
average claims-to-premium ratio of disaster insurance was only sixty
percent. Very few changes to the reinsurance scheme were made,
231
although the CCR reinsured mainly the bad risks, and excessively
high compensation (twenty-four percent) was paid for (largely
232
imaginary) administrative costs. In addition, the combined effects of
changes in the market (mergers, freedom of services within Europe,

amount that an insurer will have to bear in the course of a year, regardless of how many losses
occur.
230. Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Disaster Insurance or a Disastrous
Insurance – Natural Disaster Insurance in France 1 (CESifo GmbH, CESifo Working Paper No.
1303, 2004).
231. See VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, supra note 169, at 86. Von Ungern-Sternberg argues
that since the insurers have the right, but not an obligation, to reinsure a share of their natural
disaster risk with the CCR, they have a strong incentive to lobby the government to set high
premiums for natural disasters. It is then in the insurers’ interest to reinsure only a small part of
their risks and keep the rest of the premiums for themselves.
232. The effective cost of disaster insurance for the private insurers were, of course, almost
nil, since disaster insurance was simply added to already existing property insurance contracts.
In comparison, Spain, which employs an identical system of premium collection, only has a five
percent commission for administrative costs.
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among other changes) and the deterioration of the claims figures
made it increasingly unsuitable for just a single scheme to be offered.
As a result, from January 1, 1997 onwards, the CCR introduced new
reinsurance conditions which paid greater attention to the nature of
each ceding company’s portfolio and enabled insurers to retain a
233
larger proportion of the risks. Still, in 1999, the CCR was on the
verge of bankruptcy after it was called upon to make a major
withdrawal on its reserves. Several major events hit France in 1999—
flooding in the Aude department in the south during November
(insured losses of € 240 million), flooding following the Winter
Storms Lothar and Martin (insured losses of € 240 million), and
damage following a significant hurricane in the French Antilles. At
the same time, an unexpected peril—soil subsidence—appeared in
1989, inducing a gradual erosion of the CCR’s reserves over time. The
State guarantee was consequently called into play. As a result, other
amendments to the reinsurance scheme needed to be made to better
adapt to the market situation, such as modifying the underwriting
conditions, changing the applied deductibles, changing the
234
deductibles in case the municipality lacks a PPRN, recapitalizing its
reserves (the government injected three billion French francs, or €
235
460 million), and abolishing compensation for administrative costs.
Von Ungern-Sternberg, amongst others, has concluded that
these various amendments to the CCR scheme are the outcomes of
236
flaws in the institutional setup. On the other hand, Cannarsa and
others, backed up by the Insurance Journal and A.M. Best, have a
237
very positive outlook on the CCR.
233. Caisse Centrale de Réassurance, Les Catastrophes Naturelles en France 20 (2007)
[hereinafter CCR].
234. The PPRN is the Plan for the Prevention of Foreseeable Natural Risks (Plan de
Prévention des Risques Naturels Prévisibles) and is a specific plan that municipalities have to
draw up concerning the prevention of catastrophic risks.
235. A. Erhard-Cassegrain, et al., Minitére De L’écologie Et Du Développement,
Évolution du Régime D’ Indemnisation des Catastrophes Naturelles (2004), available at
http://temis.documentation.equipement.gouv.fr/documents/Temis/0063/Temis0063158/18088.pdf; CCR, supra note 233, at 21; Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Catastrophe
Insurance: Spain vs. France, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/59/33/37781875.pdf (last visited Sep. 10, 2012); Suzanne Vallet, The French Experience
in the Management and Compensation of Large Scale Disasters, in Catastrophic Risks and
Insurance 293 (OECD ed., 2006); Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Risk
Selection in Natural Disaster Insurance—The Case of France, (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1683,
2006).
236. See VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, supra note 169, at 82–104 (discussing natural disaster
insurance in France and the problems associated with the system).
237. See Cannarsa et al., supra note 40, at 43.
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4. The Government as Reinsurer of Last Resort: Terrorism
i. TRIA
The American Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA)
establishes a temporary program of shared public and private
compensation for insured losses resulting from foreign acts of
238
terrorism. The goal of the program is to “protect consumers by
addressing market disruptions and ensure the continued widespread
availability and affordability” of terrorism insurance and to “allow for
a transitional period for the private markets to stabilize, resume
pricing of such insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future
239
losses.” TRIA essentially creates a federal backstop for terrorism
insurance by providing financial support for payment of terrorism
claims in the event of a fairly large terrorism incident. The program is
similar to reinsurance in that it provides reimbursement to insurers
after they pay claims to a specified level (the deductible) and in that
240
insurers retain a portion of the risk (a co-pay). In contrast to
reinsurance, insurers do not pay a premium to be eligible and the
government does not establish any reserves. Instead, the costs of the
TRIA program are borne by the taxpayers with some or all of the
costs subject to recoupment. In short, TRIA offers an illustration of
the federal government providing coverage above a baseline risk that
remains under the coverage of private insurers. The federal
government temporarily assumes the role of excess liability insurer
(or as reinsurer of last resort), providing a cap on the losses for which
the private insurance industry remains responsible in the event of a
241
terrorist attack. While initially set to last for two years (with the
expiration date set at December 31, 2005), it has been systematically
242
extended ever since.

238. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2002)). The TRIA act does not cover any of the September 11th
losses.
239. Id.
240. Thomas Russell & Jeffrey E. Thomas, Government Support for Terrorism Insurance,
15 CONN. INS. L.J. 183, 186 (2008).
241. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 28, at 325.
242. See, e.g., President Signs TRIA Extension, INSURANCE J. ONLINE (Dec. 27, 2007),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/12/27/85948.htm
(discussing
2007
extension through 2014).
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243

All insurers providing commercial
property or casualty
244
insurance are required to participate in TRIA. “The insurers must
make terrorism insurance available to all policyholders,” but are free
to choose the applicable extra terrorism premium, which should not
245
be excessive, inadequate, or discriminatory.
“If a certified foreign act of terrorism causes losses in excess of
[five million dollars], participating insurers must pay a certain amount
in claims—a deductible—before federal governmental assistance can
246
become available.” This deductible is now set at twenty percent of
247
the insurer’s directly earned premiums during the preceding year.
Eighty-five percent of losses above the deductible will be covered by
the federal government, while the insurance industry contributes
fifteen percent. There is an annual cap of $100 billion to all aggregate
insured losses.
In case the cap would be exceeded, Congress has the authority to
decide who will pay and in what amounts: the Treasury Secretary
shall determine the pro rata share of insured losses to be paid by
each insurer that incurs insured losses under the program . . .
Insurers that meet the deductible will not be liable for losses in
248
excess of this cap.

ii. GAREAT

249

French primary insurers that offer fire insurance are required by
law to provide terrorism coverage as well. In practice, coverage
against acts of terrorism was generally included in all standard

243. TRIA only applies to commercial property and casualty insurance, which is defined to
specifically include excess insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, and during the first
three years of the TRIA Program, surety insurance. Workers’ compensation insurance
mandatorily includes insurance against terrorism, even without TRIA. See HOCKMAN ET AL.,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TERRORISM REINSURANCE POOL FEASBILITY STUDY: SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1 (2004) (explaining how workers’ compensation can deal with
the problem of terrorism losses). TRIA does not apply to personal insurance, such as
homeowners’, automobile, or life insurance. Moreover, by law, the TRIA program does not
apply to: federal or private crop insurance; private mortgage insurance, or title insurance;
financial guaranty insurance offered by a monoline financial guaranty insurance corporation;
insurance for medical malpractice; health or life insurance, including group life insurance;
federal flood insurance; and reinsurance or retrocessional reinsurance.
244. BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 442.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 443.
248. Id.
249. The GAREAT section borrows from a book written by one of the authors, see
BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 309–12. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted.
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insurance policies, meaning that all private and commercial
properties were generally covered against terrorism events. However,
th
after the September 11 attacks, reinsurers cancelled their terrorism
coverage and many primary insurers that could not obtain
reinsurance chose to stop offering (especially commercial) property
insurance to avoid the mandatory terrorism coverage. According to
250
French insurance industry officials,
the French government
responded to this situation by first temporarily requiring the
extension of all contracts, and then beginning negotiations with the
insurance industry to develop a more permanent solution. As a result,
the GAREAT (Gestion de l’Assurance et de la Réassurance des
Risques Attentats et Actes de Terrorisme) reinsurance pool was
created jointly by insurers, reinsurers, and the CCR on January 1,
2002. The idea of GAREAT is based on the existing administrative
structures of the insurance associations and the natural catastrophe
program already in place in France. The goal of GAREAT is to cover
acts of terrorism (including those involving the use of nuclear
weapons) that cause damages on French territory and assimilated
territories.
Though GAREAT membership is not mandatory for insurance
companies operating in France, insurers affiliated with the national
association of insurance companies (Fédération Francaise des
Sociétés d’Assurances) and the main trade body for mutuals
(Groupements des Entreprises Mutuelles d’Assurance) automatically
qualify as members of the pool. Upon subscription to GAREAT,
each member is liable in proportion to the amount of the premiums
ceded to the pool with respect to the subscription year.
The GAREAT program is divided into two sections: “Large
Risks” and “Small and Medium-Sized Risks.” The Large Risks
section entails all contracts which fall within the scope of application
of the GAREAT pool and whose insured sums are in excess of € 20
million. The Small and Medium-Sized Risks section includes
contracts less than € 20 million. This section will not be discussed
further, since properties less than € 20 million may be ceded to the
pool on a voluntary basis.
Both sections are the subject of specific provisions and each
section is divided into layers. The first layer of the program consists of
co-reinsurance between the members of the pool. The losses to this
layer are split between the members proportionally to their respective

250. See U.S. GAO, supra note 228, at 39–40.

Faure (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2012]

1/7/2013 7:51 PM

INSURANCE AGAINST CATASTROPHE

233

shares. The next layers consist of reinsurance by professional
reinsurers, who provide capacity in the form of Annual Aggregate
XOL treaties. These layers are the subject of reinsurance treaties.
The top layer consists of unlimited reinsurance granted by the CCR
with a guarantee from the French state. This layer is the subject of a
reinsurance treaty with the CCR. For this purpose, the CCR receives
a premium from GAREAT.
In 2012, the co-reinsurance layer had a limit of € 400 million for
the entirety of the losses. The second, third, fourth, and fifth layers
constitute the Annual Aggregate Excess of Loss reinsurance program
taken out by GAREAT on the international reinsurance market. The
second to fifth layers are each limited to € 400 million. The sixth layer
constitutes the top layer where the CCR provides coverage (with an
unlimited guarantee from the French State), with an XOL threshold
of € 2 billion.
251
The figure below illustates the reinsurance scheme:

Fig. 2. GAREAT layer system.

251. Christine de Bondy, Secretary-General of GAREAT, Terrorism Schemes in the
th
World: France: GAREAT, Questions and Issues before 6 Meeting of the World Forum of
Catastrophe Programmes 18 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.ccrif.org/partnerships/WFCP/
Sessions/Day2/France_GAREAT_WFCP_Meeting_Oct_2011.pdf.
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The GAREAT premium rates are fixed by reference to the
amount of the sums insured:
Amount of total sums insured
GAREAT premium rate
Sum insured < € 6 mio (facultative session)
3%
€ 6 mio < sum insured < € 20 mio
6%
€ 20 mio < sum insured < € 50 mio
12 %
€ 50 mio < sum insured
18 %
sum insured > € 750 mio
quoted individually
nuclear risks
24 %
exceptional risks (e.g. captives)
special rating
Table 1. GAREAT premium layers.

Consequently, in 2007 GAREAT earned € 252 million in
premiums on 105,000 policies.
iii. NHT

252

The Dutch government and the Dutch Association of Insurers
agreed to set up a dedicated reinsurance company, called the Dutch
Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Company (NHT), to cover insurance
against terrorist acts in all classes of business. This step represented
an intervention measure to address a market failure to supply
terrorism risk coverage.
253
Since July 1, 2003, more than 250 insurance companies (ninetythree percent of all active Dutch insurers), the government, and some
reinsurance companies participate in the NHT. The participating
insurance companies cede all their terrorism exposure to the NHT
pool, which acts as a reinsurance company. The overall capacity of is
limited to € 1 billion per calendar year. It was foreseen that this
threshold of € 1 billion would be gathered in three layers: the first €
400 million will be reinsured by the participating primary insurers,
while losses in excess of € 400 million in the annual aggregate will be
protected under a reinsurance market XOL program valued at € 300
million, with any shortfall taken up by the Dutch government, acting
as a reinsurer of last resort, up to another € 300 million. The first layer
applies a so-called threshold deductible, meaning that insurers bear
the risk to € 7,5 million.

252. The NHT section borrows from a book written by one of the authors, see
BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 377–79. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted.
253. The NHT became operational on July 1, 2003. It has been periodically extended for
additional periods, and is expected to be further extended as long as market conditions require.
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The Dutch government charges a premium at a level intended to
price itself out of the market when terrorism risk insurability is
restored. From the period of July 1, 2003 until December 31, 2003, the
government charged a premium of € 10 million (€ 20 million on a
254
yearly basis). A system of descending premiums is used for
increasing coverage. For example, the first part of coverage is
relatively expensive—coverage of € 100 million demands the same
premium as the next increment of € 200 million. Thus, an incentive is
incorporated into the system in order to stimulate the recovery of
commercial insurance: if individual reinsurers are capable of covering
the risk, expectations are that they would offer coverage for a lower
premium. This point of departure seemed to pay off, since a
commercial reinsurer declared itself willing to cover the first € 100
million of governmental coverage (namely between € 700 and 800
million), delaying governmental intervention until the € 200 million
255
threshold.
B. Analysis
The focus of this part is to compare the different arrangements
that have been described in the previous paragraphs. The criteria
established in Part III will serve as the framework for this comparison
in order to evaluate which economic criteria have been fulfilled by
the different kinds of government interventions.
1. Non-distortive Government Intervention
In the case of the CEA, it is doubtful whether there really was an
absence of a market solution after the Northridge Earthquake, since
other insurers provided coverage for earthquakes. Rather, it is an
example where the government steps in as primary insurer and thus
competes with other insurers. Whether the CCS had to be established
in 1954 due to the absence of market solutions is not entirely clear. It
is possible that a similar mechanism could have been provided by the
market. This is similar to the case of the CCR. It is not so clear that
without the CCR insurance of natural disasters would have been
impossible. It is clear, though, that an unlimited guarantee (which is
provided by France to the CCR) would never be provided by an
ordinary reinsurer. Concerning the terrorism cases, it is clear that,
254. Parliamentary Proceedings of the Second Chamber of Representatives 2002–2003, 28
668, No. 2, 23 June 2003.
255. Parliamentary Proceedings of the Second Chamber of Representatives 2002–2003, 28
915, No. 5, 12 August 2003, p. 3.
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indeed, no market solution would have been possible. TRIA, for
example, was clearly created because, after 9/11, insurance companies
worldwide had withdrawn from covering terrorism risk, creating a
market vacuum.
2. Charging Risk-based Premiums
The criteria for setting CEA premiums indicate that premium
prices reflect risk. Indeed, the California Insurance Code states that
“[r]ates established by the authority shall be actuarially sound so as to
256
not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.” From this,
one can conclude that premiums should in theory always reflect risk.
However, this is not the case for the CCS. Since 1987, the CCS has set
premiums that are unrelated to risk and equal for the entire country.
The CCR’s criteria for its premium prices are not entirely clear. It has
to pay a premium for the provided State guarantee—which should, in
principle, be market-based.
The terrorism cases are not identical. It is clear that the
reinsurance provided by TRIA is an outright subsidy since insurers do
not even pay a premium. The NHT, on the other hand, does charge
risk-based premiums.
3. Stimulate Market Solutions
It is unclear how the CEA stimulates a market solution since the
government competes with commercial insurers. Given that the CCS
sets its own premiums that are unrelated to risk, the CCS does not
really stimulate market solutions either. Recalling that the CCR
benefits from an unlimited guarantee provided by the French
government, which would never be provided by an ordinary
reinsurer, it is also unclear how the CCR stimulates a market
solution. In fact, the CCR is clearly not market competitive because
its premiums are inherently more attractive due to their State
guarantee. In that sense, the CCR is more of a market disruption than
a solution.
An important feature of TRIA is that the State does not
completely take over the risk since insurers must still pay a modest
deductible. Nevertheless, one could argue that this still stimulates a
market solution. Similarly, GAREAT could be regarded as a market
stimulator to a certain extent, especially with regard to its first and
second layers. However, GAREAT’s reliance on state-guaranteed,

256. CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.40 (2010).
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unlimited reinsurance granted by the CCR reduces the extent to
which GAREAT indeed stimulates market solutions. The NHT, on
the other hand, stimulates market solutions because it seems to set
premiums in such a way that it also becomes attractive for private
(re)insurers to develop their own insurance products.
4. Leaving Freedom for Insurers to Choose State Reinsurance
The freedom to join the CEA is relative since insurers are
required to offer earthquake coverage. The CCS, on the other hand,
establishes an arrangement in which insurers have the freedom to
choose. In the case of the CCR, it is not particularly clear. Insurers
have freedom to contract with private reinsurance companies, but
some sources argue that insurance companies would have to transfer
at least half of their natural disaster risk to the CCR. The three
terrorism cases provide a clear example of schemes in which the
government leaves the freedom with the insurers to participate or
not.
5. Temporary Character
The CEA, CCS, and CCR do not seem to have a temporary
character.
TRIA was initially established as a temporary program, but has
since been continually extended. GAREAT was never established as
a temporary program. The projected duration of the NHT is unclear,
but it may be temporary given its premium structure and the strong
incentives it sets to create market solutions.
C. Summary
We have presented various examples where the government
provides some kind of intervention, usually to supplement insurance
coverage in the compensation of disasters. These examples and the
257
subsequent analyses could easily be extended to other cases as well.
All we wish to show with these examples is that, in fact, no matter
what type of structure is followed, there are some striking similarities
and differences. It is remarkable that a premium is not always
charged for government intervention (as in TRIA) and that in cases
257. For further examples of how to improve the management and insurability of largescale disasters, see Alberto Monti, Public-Private Initiatives to Cover Extreme Events, 5 THE
GENEVA REPORTS: RISK AND INSURANCE RESEARCH 27 (2011); Alberto Monti, Climate
Change and Weather-Related Disasters: What Role for Insurance, Reinsurance, and Financial
Sectors?, 15 HASTINGS W.NW. J. ENVT’L POL’Y 151 (2009).
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where this premium is charged, it is doubtful that the premium
actually reflects risk. Moreover, in some cases, the government in fact
competes with the market (CEA) and in other cases merely provides
a government guarantee because otherwise an insurance cartel could
258
simply refuse to provide coverage altogether. In those cases,
government intervention is problematic in the sense that one can
wonder to what extent it actually stimulates a market solution.
Moreover, in practice, none of the solutions presented has a
temporary character.
If one would compare the performance of government acting as
primary insurer (for example, the CEA and CCS), our examples seem
to be doing relatively poorly since they do not have a temporary
character and do not stimulate market solutions. However, on the
basis of these results, one should be careful in concluding that this
type of government intervention is therefore necessarily inferior to
the role of government acting as reinsurer of last resort. After all,
there are other cases where government monopolies have done very
259
well in avoiding the charity hazard and in stimulating prevention. It
is also striking that in the three cases we discussed concerning
governments reinsuring the terrorism risk, there are some similarities
and differences. In all three cases there was a clear absence of a
market solution since the traditional insurers refused to cover
terrorism risk after 9/11. Also, in all three schemes the government
leaves the freedom to join with the insurers. However, only the Dutch
scheme (NHT) seems to set premiums in such a way that it becomes
attractive for commercial (re)insurers to develop their own insurance
products. This is, as we just mentioned, obviously not the case in the
United States, where TRIA basically provides gratis reinsurance.
Each of the examples provided shows that it is difficult to
structure government intervention in a way that corresponds
completely with economic principles. To some extent this is not
surprising since the intervention of government in stimulating
insurance markets may always have the character of a subsidy. These

258. This is, for example, the case in the Netherlands where crop insurance is covered
through Agriver with a government guarantee. See Véronique Bruggeman, Michael G. Faure &
Karine Fiore, The Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophe Risks?, 35 THE GENEVA PAPERS
369, 383–84 (2010) (explaining that crop insurance is covered through Agriver with
governmental guarantee in the Netherlands).
259. See, e.g., Emons, supra note 153, at 249–50; see also generally Raschky, supra note 108
(comparison of risk transfer systems indicate that government intervention may not exacerbate
the charity hazard).
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(preliminary) results do give some support to those who were critical
260
of government intervention in the first place.
The results from this modest comparison of the cases discussed in
this part can be summarized as follows:

CEA
CCS
CCR
TRIA
GAREAT
NHT

Nondistortive
government
intervention?
+/+/+
+
+

Premium
Reflect
Risk?

Stimulate
Market
Solution?

Temporary
Character?

Freedom
for
Insurer?

+
+/+/+

+/+/+

+/+/-

+/+
+/+
+
+

Table 2. Comparison of the Six Cases

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Compensation for victims of catastrophes is a hot topic in many
countries. This is due both to the damage in the aftermath of 9/11 and
the increasing number of natural disasters that have affected the
United States, Asia, and Europe. Accordingly, there has been an
increasing amount of legislative intervention to stimulate insurance
markets in public-private partnerships. The reactions in the literature
to these types of constructions vary: some economic literature relying
largely on market solutions is quite critical of this intervention,
whereas other, more insurance-related literature argues that these
types of government intervention should be welcomed since they
increase the insurability of risks that would otherwise be uninsurable.
The aim of our paper was to add to that debate by looking at specific
cases where the government acts either as a primary insurer or as a
reinsurer of last resort. Indeed, to some extent the arguments in favor
of or against government acting as a (re)insurer of catastrophe risks
play at a high level of abstraction.
Of course, we have merely discussed a few of the possible forms
of government intervention, most of them focusing on the supply side.
Other literature discusses many additional alternatives, some of
which focus on the demand side. Some examples include tax
reductions for victims of catastrophes and outright subsidies to

260. See Role for Government, supra note 4, at 44–51; see also Levmore & Logue, supra
note 95, at 308–09.
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261

charitable organizations. If compensation of victims is the main
goal, other structural arrangements are also possible, such as in the
262
sphere of social security. Discussing all of these alternatives was
outside the scope of our Article.
On the basis of theoretical law-and-economics literature, we
posited a few conditions for efficient (or at least minimally disruptive)
government supplementation of disaster insurance markets. For
example, one important question is whether the government
intervention is absolutely necessary—in other words, would a similar
market solution have emerged without the intervention? Insurers
may argue that they consider a risk uninsurable and thus call on
government relief, but this does not necessarily mean the risk was
actually uninsurable. Also, effective intervention means that a
government asks for a premium price that mimics the market price.
However, that supposes that one can actually know the price of an
actuarially fair premium, which may be difficult in some cases.
Moreover, as demonstrated by many of the examples we discussed,
sometimes the government simply does not want to ask for an
actuarially fair premium, since doing so may jeopardize the
affordability of the scheme (premiums may become prohibitively
high). If that is the case, one could question whether the government
should intervene by providing gratis reinsurance or whether specific
differentiated subsidies should be provided to individuals to allow
263
them to purchase differentiated insurance contracts. The examples
in this paper show that it is difficult in practice to structure
government intervention in a way that corresponds with principles of
economic efficiency. To some extent, this may not be surprising; some
types of government intervention aim not only at efficiency, but also
at redistribution. However, the question again arises whether acting
as reinsurer of last resort is the most effective way of redistributing
money to victims of catastrophes. We have argued that this
intervention may be less distortive than ex post relief. By stimulating
or backing up insurance markets, at least some differentiation of risks
is possible—which is usually totally absent in the case of ex post relief.
Regardless, many of the examples we discussed indicate that
intervention as reinsurer of last resort often amounts to a state
subsidy.
261. Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 308–09.
262. See Langendonck, supra note 21, at 187–97 (discussing funding options at the
international level).
263. As recently suggested by Kunreuther.
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Based on analysis of specific cases where the government acts as
(re)insurer of catastrophic risks, we argue that there may be fewer
reasons for economists’ traditional objections against government
intervention. The Switzerland example clearly shows that it may be
possible to have an efficient public insurance monopoly that prevents
catastrophic risks and the charity hazard more effectively than
commercial insurance markets. Moreover, reality shows that
politicians will always find it hard to resist ex post relief despite the
objections of economists. Even though government acting as
(re)insurer of catastrophic risk may not always completely comply
with economic principles, it is at least far superior to the Santa Claus
model of ex post relief. In the future, given the expectation that many
countries may be confronted with huge amounts of catastropherelated damage, government-supported insurance mechanisms
certainly deserve more attention.

